State-owned Enterprise Executives' Political Promotion, The Quality Of Environmental Information Disclosure And Stock Price Crash Risk

China's stock market has experienced six large-scale crashes so far.Especially in 2015 and 2016.There are frequent occurrences of “more than 1000 stocks' price hitting limit down,which has attracted the attention of regulators,investors,and academia.It has become one of the latest hot topics in the field of micro-finance.The paper focuses on the problem of disclosure of environmental information in high-pollution industries and combines the special background of “para-government” executives of state-owned enterprises to explore the relationship among the political promotion of senior executives of SOEs,the quality of disclosure of environmental information,and the stock price crash risk.The paper provides empirical evidence for the formation of stock price crash risk in high-pollution industries.The paper discusses the literature related to executives' political promotion,the quality of environmental information disclosure and stock price crash risk and then combines realistic systems and background to put forward the theoretical analysis framework for political promotion of SOE executives,the quality of environmental information disclosure and stock price crash risk,which is based on management hiding information hypothesis,principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,signaling theory,stakeholder theory,implicit contract theory and championship theory.Afterwards,combining normative and empirical research methods,the paper studies listed companies in high-pollution industries to explore the influence law of political promotion of SOE executives on stock price crash risk by using multiple linear regressions and empirical tests,and also to explore the impact of political promotion of SOE executives on the quality of environmental information disclosure,the influence law of the quality of environmental information disclosure on stock price crash risk and the conductive law of the impact political promotion of SOE executives on stock price crash risk through the quality of environmental information disclosure.The paper shows that high political promotion expectations of senior SOE executives is expected to reduce stock price crash risk.In addition,as for high-pollution industry,SOE executives' political promotion high expectations is expected to help improve the quality of environmental information disclosure.The higher the quality of environmental information disclosure,the higher the risk of stock price collapse can be suppressed.SOE executives' political promotion could affect stock price crash risk through the quality of environmental information disclosure.Finally,based on the research conclusions,the thesis puts forward policy suggestions such as improving the information disclosure of senior management of listed companies and environmental information disclosure systems,optimizing the incentive mechanism and evaluation system of senior executives of state-owned enterprises.The paper enriches management hiding information hypothesis,implicit contract theory,championship theory,signaling theory,stakeholder theory and some other theories.It also supplements research on the economic consequences of political promotion of senior executives,the problem of the quality of environmental information disclosure and research related to factors that influence the stock price crash risk.The paper proposes an analytical framework for the political promotion of senior executives in SOEs,the quality of disclosure of environmental information and the stock price crash risk,which provides a paradigm for studies related to executive incentives,executive behavior and economic consequences.