Research On The Influence And Mechanism Of Political Promotion Incentive Of State-owned Enterprise Executives On Enterprise Value

As an important promoter of the reform and development of state-owned enterprises(SOEs),SOEs executives have been widely concerned by academia in China.Especially in recent years,the problems of internal corruption and the loss of state-owned assets exposed by SOEs have further pushed the executives of SOEs to the center of academic research.With the gradual development of research on SOEs executives,it has been found that effective incentives could alleviate agency conflicts,control high-risk moral risks and adverse selection behaviors,and encourage executives to earnestly manage their businesses and strive to enhance the value of SOEs.Therefore,using what effective ways to motivate the executives of SOEs is a question that the scholars need to answer urgently.Earlier research mainly focused on explicit incentives such as executive shareholding and salary incentives.However,with the further development of the research,scholars have found that the special "politician" identity of SOEs executives makes them interested in and pursues political promotion,and the pursuit of political promotion is greatly affectting the operation and management behavior of them.Thus,some scholars have begun to suggest that political promotion may be an effective way to motivate executives of SOEs,and unified and clear answer has not been given until now.Based on this,under the Chinese context,this article has studied the impact of political promotion incentives on the value of SOEs and the impact mechanism in details.The specific content of the research has three points: first one,the impact of political promotion incentives on SOEs value;Second one,the mechanism of the influence of political promotion incentives on corporate value.According to the previous literature and related theoretical analysis,this paper selects two mediator variables,corporate investment and corporate size,to explore whether it will play an mediate role between political promotion incentive and corporate value.The moderating role of career expectation in the influences of political promotion incentives on enterprise value.First,this article reviews the relevant literature on the key variables such as political promotion incentives and corporate value.Then,on the basis of literature analysis,combining political promotion tournament theory,principal-agent theory,management defense theory and career development theory to analyze and deduce the relationship between variables.And from this,the research hypothesises of the influence and mechanism of political promotion incentives on enterprise value are extracted.Finally,this paper takes the executives who got change in state-owned listed companies inShanghai-Shenzhen A-share from 2009 to 2018 as the research object,and uses empirical research methods to test and verify the research hypothesises.It turns out that:First,political promotion incentive have a significant negative impact on corporate value;Second,corporate investment plays an mediate role in this negative impact.Third,expanding the scale of enterprise also plays an mediate role in this negative impact.Forth,career expectations play a significant negative moderated effective in this process of influence.Under the premise of the "China Context",the relationship and mechanism between political promotion incentive,corporate value,corporate investment,expansion of corporate size,and career expectations are basically clarified.Further deepening the research on political promotion incentive,to a certain extent,it provides empirical evidence for the construction of political promotion incentive theory,and provides a basis for optimizing the incentive mechanism of SOEs executives and improving the corporate governance mechanism.