Study On The Comprehensive Governance Effect Of Internal Control And Equity Incentive On Inefficiency Investment

Under the current economic background,the market resource's configuration effectively depends on the efficiency of investment,high efficiency of investment is the key to maintaining steady economic growth speed,but also to promoting exports and boosting domestic consumer demand.State-owned listed companies in the investment activities has brought a steady stream of power to the whole national economic growth,and it is an important part of national economy for promoting the sustainable and healthy and rapid development of the national economy indispensable a part.State-owned listed company investment behavior is very complex,and many times can't make a guide by the reasonable method.It is easy to cause the efficiency of investment affect the entire country's coordinated development of national economy to a certain extent.There is some controversy in the theoretical circle about the investment behavior,and many theoretical analysis is not applicable to the actual situation,which needs to be improved in the future research.It is for this reason that the research on the investment behavior of state-owned listed companies is of great significance for grasping the overall economic development,which deserves further exploration and exploration.Based on the problems above,this paper takes 2012-2016 years Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of state-owned listed companies as the research object,combing the investment and non-efficiency,equity incentive,internal control related literature at home and abroad,describing the core concepts and theoretical basis of this thesis related problems,and put forward the hypothesis based on the related theories.By reference to the previous model,the article focuses on the state-owned listed company inefficient investment level estimates,then an empirical analysis of the influence of non efficiency of investment,internal control,equity incentive effect on the efficiency of investment,the synergistic effect of two on non efficiency investment incentives and internal control and ownership.This paper studies the relationship between internal control,equity incentive and enterprise inefficiency investment based on the financial data of state-owned listedcompanies in China.The research finds that:(1)internal control can effectively inhibit inefficient investment;(2)equity incentive can effectively inhibit inefficient investment;(3)internal control and equity incentive have synergistic effect on underinvestment.This is the first study on the internal control theory,equity incentive effect on non-efficiency investment expansion,developing a new perspective to broaden the existing research areas,in a certain sense for the specification and the equity incentive mechanism to help improve the internal control of the company,but also provide reference for China's state-owned listed companies to improve the efficiency of investment.