Research On The Effect And Evolutionary Game Of Credit Behaviors Of Rural Land Management Right Mortgage Financing Subjects

With the advancement of agricultural scale and industrialization,it has been shown that the demand of rural funds is multi-level and diversified.But the contradiction between supply and demand of rural funds is increasingly prominent because of the lack of effective collateral.In order to meet the needs of rural funds and give full play to the economic value of rural land,relevant important documents of the state clearly indicate that the right to contracted land is allowed to be mortgaged to agricultural bank institutions.As an innovative financial product,rural land management right mortgage financing not only can effectively solve the problem of “difficult loans” for farmers and “difficult loans” for banks,but also promote the scale and modernization of agriculture,and at the same time achieve the win-win goal of profitability of financial institutions and income growth of farmers.However,there are many problems existing in the rural land management right mortgage financing which have seriously restricted the credit behaviors of farmers and financial institutions.It is very significant to standardize the credit behaviors of farmers and financial institutions in rural land management right mortgage financing and promote the orderly development of rural land management right mortgage financing.This paper takes the credit behaviors of farmers and financial institutions as an entry point.It deeply analyzes the status,effect and existing problems of credit behaviors of farmers and financial institutions.It adopts an ordered logistic model to study the influencing factors and degree of the effect of financing subjects' credit behaviors.On this basis,the relevant influencing factors are incorporated into the evolutionary game model to analyze the long-term evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the credit behaviors of farmers and financial institutions.Finally this paper puts forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions.Chapter is introduction.This chapter introduces the research background,purpose and ?significance of this article,and sorts out credit behaviors of farmer households and financial institutions,credit behaviors' game of farmers and financial institutions,and financing effects on rural land management right mortgage financing.Then this chapter presents the research ideas,methods and possible innovations.Chapter ?is related concepts and theoretical basis.This chapter defines the related concepts of the effects of rural land management right mortgage financing,and elaborates the theoretical basis of this paper,including behavioral economic theory,transaction cost theory,credit risk theory and evolutionary game theory.Chapter ?is the status,effects and existing problems of credit behaviors of rural land management right mortgage financing subjects.The chapter expounds the status of credit behaviors of rural land management right mortgage financing subjects,analyzes the effect of credit behaviors from farmers and financial institutions and the existing problems of credit behaviors.Chapter is the analysis of the influence factors of the effects of rural land management ?right mortgage financing subjects' credit behaviors.Firstly,this chapter describes statistically the characteristics of individual households and families,characteristics of the value of collateral,characteristics of transaction costs,and cognitive characteristics of policy environment.Secondly,it constructs a multi-ordered Logistic model to analyze the influencing factors of the effects of rural land management right mortgage financing subjects' credit behaviors from three aspects of the value of collateral value,transaction cost factor and policy environment factor.Finally,this chapter calculates the marginal effect value to reflect the specific impact degree and ranks them.Chapter ?is the analysis of the evolutionary game of credit behaviors of rural land management right mortgage financing subjects.This chapter incorporates the factors that affect the credit behavior of rural households and financial institutions into the evolutionary game model.What's more it constructs an evolutionary game model of the credit behavior of rural households and financial institutions on rural land management right mortgage financing,and proposes the basic assumptions of the model.It establishes the replication dynamic equations of two groups of farmers and financial institutions.then this chapter analyzes the evolutionary equilibrium results generated by two different situations in which the financial institutions' disposal of farmland management rights is greater than or less than the amount of loan principal and interest.Finally it uses Matlab simulation tools according to Pingluo County farmland management rights mortgage financing practice to verify.Chapter is the conclusions a? nd suggestions.This paper finds that the effects of credit behaviors of rural land management right mortgage financing subjects have shown initial effects,and the factors influencing the effects of credit behavior are diverse and orderly.The game process of the credit behaviors of rural land management right mortgage financing subjects is a complex and dynamic process.There are multiple factors which affect the long-term evolutionary equilibrium of credit behaviors of farmers and financial institutions.Based on this,it puts forward suggestions for optimizing credit behaviors of rural land management right mortgage financing subjects.