Characteristics Of Board Of Directors,Property Right And Risk Of Stock Price Collapse

The stock price collapse risk refers to the probability that the stock price will fall sharply.Compared with the capital markets of developed countries,the phenomenon of stock price crash in China's capital market is more common.The stock price crash may cause mismatch of economic resources and thus jeopardize the smooth operation and development of the capital market.How to prevent and reduce the risk of stock price collapse has become a hot topic of concern and research in the theoretical and practical circles in recent years.Initially,the research on the cause of stock price collapse in the academic circles started from the market level.Scholars mainly studied the stock price crash from the perspective of rational equilibrium and behavioral finance.In Jin and Myers(2006),from the perspective of agency theory and information asymmetry,the "bad news collection theory" was put forward.After laying the research foundation for the theory of stock price collapse at the company level,the research focus on the cause of stock price collapse gradually shifted from the market level.To the company level.According to the "bad news hoarding theory",the separation of ownership and management rights in modern companies creates a conflict of interest between shareholders and managers.Managers have a series of incentives to hide or post bad news in order to exaggerate the company's financial performance;These bad news accumulate to a certain extent,the manager can not continue to hide or hide the cost is too high,the bad news will be released once,causing the bubble to burst,the stock price is adjusted downwards,causing the stock price to collapse.Based on the basis of the "bad news collection theory",the research on the influencing factors of the stock price collapse risk is mostly discussed at the company level.In terms of internal factors of the company,some scholars analyze from the perspective of information quality,such as information transparency,tax avoidance,accounting conservatism,and internal control information disclosure.Other scholars start from the perspective of management motivation and examine the management option incentives.The impact of executive over-remuneration,religious beliefs,executive gender and corporate social responsibility on the risk of stock price collapse;in terms of external factors of the company,scholars mainly study from the perspectives of analysts,tax collection and investor protection.Few scholars have studied the impact of board characteristics on the risk of stock price collapse from the perspective of internal corporate governance.In corporate governance,it is often difficult for shareholders to effectively monitor management.Under the framework of agency theory,the role of the board of directors is to solve the agency problem between management and shareholders,and to effectively supervise the internal mechanism and management of the company.Effective supervision can stop the fraud that management has made in pursuit of its own interests,thereby reducing the risk of stock price collapse.Research shows that building a reasonable board governance structure can strengthen mutual supervision among members,enhance the independence of the board of directors,and improve the effectiveness of board governance.Therefore,unlike the previous literature,based on the quality of accounting information and management motivation,this paper examines the mechanism of stock price crash.This paper starts from the perspective of governance,starting from the characteristics of the board of directors,and studies the impact of board characteristics on the company's future stock price collapse risk.A reasonable board governance structure that reduces the risk of future stock price crashes.Then further consider the influence of the nature of property rights,and compare the impact of board characteristics under different property rights on the stock price collapse risk.The conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The dual position of directors of listed companies is significantly and positively related to the risk of future stock price collapse,indicating that directors and managers will increase the company's future stock price collapse risk;directors and managers will reduce independence and supervision effectiveness,thus Increase the likelihood of fraud,which in turn increases the risk of stock price crashes.(2)The shareholding ratio of directors of listed companies is significantly negatively correlated with the risk of future share price collapse,indicating that the higher the shareholding ratio of directors,the lower the risk of the company's share price collapse in the future;the higher the shareholding ratio of directors,the more the interests of the company and the interests of directors Consistently,it effectively alleviates the problem of principal-agent,improves the supervision of the board of directors,and reduces the risk of stock price collapse.(3)The number of board meetings of listed companies is significantly negatively correlated with the risk of future stock price collapse,indicating that increasing the number of board meetings is beneficial to reduce the company's future stock price crash risk;the more board meetings,the more diligent the board is in corporate governance,the board of directors There are more opportunities to remind management of self-interested behavior and stop the occurrence of fraud,thereby reducing the risk of stock price crash.(4)The impact of board characteristics on stock price collapse risk is significantly different between the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.Compared with private enterprises,the reasonable board governance structure has a more significant effect on the stock price collapse risk in state-owned enterprises.This paper studies the stock price collapse risk from the perspective of board characteristics,which not only helps to understand the role of the board of directors in listed companies with different property rights,but also improves the company's internal governance,and stabilizes the company's stock price,safeguards investors' interests and promotes The healthy development of the capital market has important practical significance.