Stock Pledge Of Controlling Shareholder And Risk Of Stock Price Collapse

In recent years,as a new financing tool,equity pledge is favored by listed companies.Equity pledge financing is becoming more and more normalized.As of February 2020,3081 A-share listed companies have been involved in the stocks occurred in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets and have not yet been released.The economic consequences of equity pledge have always been the focus of academic research.Most of the research on the economic consequences of equity pledge in China focuses on the impact on the enterprise itself,such as enterprise value,performance and so on.With the frequent occurrence of thousands of shares falling in 2015 and LETV stock pledge "breaking out" and other similar events in 2017,our research on the economic consequences of stock pledge has gradually shifted to the impact on the capital market.Based on this,this paper studies whether the pledge of controlling shareholders' equity will lead to the risk of stock price collapse,and whether earnings management plays an intermediary effect between the two.This paper further enriches the research on the economic consequences of controlling shareholders' equity pledge,and enriches the relevant literature on the internal formation path of controlling shareholders' equity pledge and the risk of stock price collapse,and provides relevant suggestions for the problems found.This paper studies the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of stock price collapse,and expounds the existence of intermediary effect of earnings management between controlling shareholders' equity pledge and the risk of stock price collapse from the perspective of information asymmetry and information hiding.In this paper,Based on the research method combining theory and practice,and based on the definition of relevant concepts and the elaboration of basic theories,this paper takes Shanghai non-financial listed companies and non-st listed companies as examples.selecting the relevant data of Listed Companies in 2010-2018 as sample values,adopting descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,regression analysis and other methods,using Excel and Stata 15.0 software data processing,the relationship between the stock pledge of the controlling shareholders and the risk of stock price collapse and the intermediary effect of earnings management in the listed company are empirically tested,and the empirical results are analyzed and the robustness of the results is tested.The total results of this paper is that: there is the positive impact between the controlling shareholders' equity pledge and the risk of stock price crash;the positive impact of majority pledge on earnings management;when earnings management is brought into the model as an intermediary variable,the empirical results show that the intermediary effect of earnings management is established,which is part of the intermediary;after the controlling shareholders carry out equity pledge financing,they will go through earnings management However,increasing the degree of information asymmetry and information hiding will lead to the risk of stock price collapse.