Whether The Majority Rule Can Increase The Investment In Polycentric Threshold Public Goods Experiment

The control of air pollution is a typical cross regional environmental governance problem,and the government and the masses adopt effective measures to solve such problems.It is the key to improve the living conditions of the interregional residents and improve their happiness.Because of the high energy consumption of coal in our country,and the increasing number of urban motor vehicles,the problem of air pollution is becoming more and more serious,which affects the safety of life and property of the residents in our country.The Chinese government attaches great importance to this problem.In recent years,it has promulgated several work plans,and clearly and specifically put forward the targets of air pollution control.In this paper,we use mathematical model deduction and economic experiment to study this problem,in which economic experiment is our main method.The innovation of this paper is that because the domestic articles are less used to study the air pollution problem in the way of the threshold public goods experiment,this study can make up some domestic research gaps on the threshold public goods.Moreover,this paper introduces the cross regional characteristics of air pollution into the experiment,and the experimental design is closer to the present.In fact,the conclusion will be more convincing.First,on the basis of the two real characteristics of the cross regional environmental problems,this paper designs two kinds of multi-Center threshold Experimental Bureau: the benchmark and the Voting Experiment Bureau.Secondly,we invite 96 undergraduates from Nanjing University of Finances and Economics to participate in our experiments by way of online recruitment.Finally,we use logit regression model and OLS panel regression model to analyze the experimental data.The results show that: 1,in the face of high losses caused by the threshold of insufficient total investment,the probability of the total investment to meet the threshold value is 73.3%,while the probability of the Voting Experiment Bureau is90%.2,if the initial endowments of the subjects are relatively high,he will invest a higher proportion of the public goods in the threshold.3.In benchmarking laboratories,women prefer to invest more initial endowments while men prefer free riding.4.In the polling Bureau,a highly sociable,low open and low altruistic candidate was more willing to vote in favor.5,in the polling laboratory,if an experimental group plays a decisive role in the experimental results,the team will beforced to invest and the other groups tend to hitchhike.From the results of these statistical analysis,we can draw a conclusion: first,people can eliminate environmental disasters to a great extent through independent investment.Although the multi center voting mechanism can also reduce the possibility of environmental disaster,the effect is not obvious.Second,the proportion of the high income group is higher than that of the low income group.Third,people's external characteristics(gender)and internal preferences(sociality,openness and altruism)affect their decisions on environmental governance input.Fourth,if a region has enough resources to provide environmental governance projects,it will manage trans regional environmental problems.Then the region will have to provide governance projects,while other regions will choose to stand by.To sum up,this paper puts forward two feasible policies: on the one hand,the government can strengthen the publicity of the risk of environmental disaster,and make people realize the seriousness of the problem;on the other hand,the government can encourage people in all regions to invest in environmental governance so as to improve the quality of life while avoiding environmental disasters.