Research On Decision Policies In Supply Chains Considering Members' Behavior When Opening Direct Channels

In order to better control the terminal sales market,simplify the hierarchical structure of supply chain and eliminate the double marginalization effect,more and more manufacturers open direct channels.Based on the manufacturer's direct channels,this study mainly focuses on two kinds of distribution strategies,they are the manufacturer encroachment by opening an online channel and the market entry by opening a store-within-a-store.This paper studies the optimal pricing and service strategies of supply chain members by involving decision makers' risk-averse behavior,product returns policy,promotion service.Firstly,this paper considers a dual-channel supply chain with a risk-averse retailer.Product returns policy is provided by the manufacturer in the online channel.Stackelberg game is used to establish the math model.The optimal decisions derived in the price exogenous and endogenous scenarios are compared.The impacts of the return policy and the risk aversion behavior on optimal decisions and members' performance are analyzed.Results show that when consumers are more loyal to the traditional channel,the retailer could obtain higher expected utility with the return amount increases.Having autonomous pricing power does not always improve the performance of manufacturer and retailer.Furthermore,this paper considers a dual-channel supply chain with both channels offer 100% money-back guarantee.Based on the retailer's risk-neutral scenario and the risk-averse scenario,this paper analyzes the impacts of the consumer's sensitivity to returns policy and retailer's risk-averse level on members' optimal decisions,product demands and their performance.Results show that retailer's risk-averse behavior will worsen the encroachment effect in the supply chain.The more sensitive consumers to the returns policy,more demand in the online channel is impaired.However,100% money-back guarantee brings benefit to both retailer and the manufacturer.Secondly,this paper considers a duopoly market and analyzes two risk-averse manufacturers' optimal market entry strategies.Results show that when both manufacturers are risk neutral,symmetric strategies are Nash equilibrium.While when both manufacturers are risk averse,asymmetric strategies may also be the Nash equilibrium,the one with higher risk-averse level will choose the retailer-resell strategy and the one with lower risk-averse level will choose the store-within-a store strategy.Next,this paper studies the optimal market entry strategy and promotion decision of the new entrant manufacturer under heterogeneous consumer groups.Results show that market entry mode,product substitution degree and consumer's service sensitivity determine the optimal promotion strategy.The profit sharing ratio is the main factor influences the market entry strategy.When this ratio is low,the store-with-a-store mode brings the entrant higher profit.Finally,the new entrant manufacturer faces two market entry strategies,the store-within-a-store strategy and the online store strategy.By using the Hotelling model,the influences of product substitution degree,profit sharing ratio and the online searching cost on new entrant's market entry strategy and optimal decisions are analyzed.The study finds that the optimal market entry strategy for the new entrant is determined by the trade-off between the online search cost and the service level.When the convenience of online shopping is higher and the incumbent provides a lower service level,the new entrant manufacturer should open the online shop.Because the service provided by the incumbent is not attractive enough to compete the convenience of the online store opened by the new entrant.Conversely,when the cost of the online search is higher,the convenience of the online store is gradually disappearing,and opening the store-with-a-store is the best market entry strategy.