Research On Decision Analysis In Dual-channel Supply Chain With A Risk-averse Supplier

In order to improve market share and attract more consumers,suppliers establish online selling channel.However,suppliers have to face new decisions in opening online product channel,like price decision for consumers with different channel preferences,coordination strategy with offline retailers,so suppliers become risk averse.As risk sensitivity exerts influence on supply chain members' decision,and demand disruption,which is due to quick changes of market,forces supply chain members to adjust their strategies,thus we research on decision analysis in dual-channel supply chain with a risk-averse supplier by employing respect theory and game theory.And we explore how risk-averse behavior influences supply chain players' decision and profit when demand disruption occurs.First,we consider a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a risk-averse supplier and a risk-neutral buyer,which is different from most papers which assume buyers are risk-averse.Through using CVaR method to evaluate supplier's utility,the Nash model is established under the condition that the supply chain players own the equal bargaining power.We figure out the equilibrium of product price,order quantity and wholesale price.We conclude that product price will increase when supplier is less riskaverse or demand fluctuation decreases and there exists a threshold value of the optimal price,the ordering quantity of the retailer will rise up first and then fall down with the product price or the supplier's risk-averse degree.Next,we discuss the portion of the supplier's profit compared with the entitle profit of supply chain.Finally,we explore supply chain members' game behavior and how risk-averse behavior influences profit allocation when demand disruption happens,which means demand increases or demand decreases.We find out that product price isn't robust under demand disruption,and that the supplier has been impacted more than the buyer.