Research On Motivation And Effect Of Non-efficiency Investment Of State-owned Enterprises Based On Corporate Governance

In 2013,the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the CPC proposed that mixed ownership economy should be actively developed.In 2014,report on the government's work furtherly proposed that pace of developing mixed ownership economy should be speeded up.In 2015,State Council issued about opinions of the state-owned enterprises developing mixed ownership economy,putting up that improving capital allocation and operation efficiency of mixed ownership reform,optimizing state-owned economic distribution,promoting and completing state-owned enterprises' modern corporate system is the key measure.In 2016,State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission vigorously promoted reform of mixed ownership,accelerating transformation towards priority of capital management.In 2017,mixed ownership reform reached implementation intensive.War industry and energy industry accomplished mixed ownership reform in turn.Under this background,comprehensively using behavioral finance theory,principal-agent theory,asymmetric information theory and the theory of enterprise value,etc.,this thesis carries out research on the motive and effect of non-efficiency investment of state-owned enterprises,based on corporate governance.According to research strategy combining theory analysis and empirical testify,the thesis carries out deep study from three aspects in corporate governance: non-efficient investment evaluation,non-efficient investment motivation and non-efficient investment effect.It reveals non-efficient investment situation in state-owned enterprises,clarifies motivation of non-efficient investment of state-owned enterprises,and analyzes alienation phenomenon of non-efficient performance effect and value effect.It aims to provide richer theory analysis and empirical accomplishment to the motivation and effect of non-efficient investment.To sum up,the conclusions are as follows:Firstly,the phenomenon of non-efficiency investment of state-owned enterprises is universal.This thesis is based on 215 samples with 11 year panel data from 2005-2015.Then,it uses Richardson model to carry out empirical evaluation and analysis of non-efficiency investment situation of state-owned enterprises.Results show that fixed assets investment of state-owned economy in 2000-2014 is more than average growth rate of 15.56% per year,which increases steadily year by year,and equals to 24% of the total investment of whole society(2014).From 2006 to 2015,non-efficiency investment phenomenon state-owned enterprise is relatively common,samples of state-owned enterprises investment degree focused on non-efficiency between-20%~+20%,up to 76.27%,the lowest 23.02%.Lack of overall investment of state-owned enterprises is greater than the excessive investment,but excessive investment of state-owned enterprise is higher than average.At the same time,actual investment levels state-owned enterprises is effected by last year's inertia,cash levels,stock return,company scale,asset-liability ratio,growth ability and companies listed age.Secondly,non-efficiency investment motivation of state-owned enterprises is complex.Based on corporate governance theory,the thesis constructs analysis framework of n on-efficiency investment motivation of state-owned enterprises.It shows that state-owned enterprise's ownership structure,structure of board of directors,structure of board of supervisors and managers all have complex influence on non-efficient investment.Empirical study shows that:(1)Equity structure has significant relationship with non-efficiency investment of state-owned enterprises.Ownership concentration(H index)and the efficiency of investment show U-type of relationship,but it's not significant.“A dominant” Z index at the 10% level is significantly negative correlated with non-efficiency investment.Further research shows that the Z index shows a significant U-shape relationship to non-efficiency investment.At the same time State-owned institutions holding amount has significantly positive correlation with non-efficiency investment degree,but there is no more complex relationship.(2)Board of directors and board of supervisors of state-owned enterprises have an important influence on the non-efficiency investment.If the chairman has representative duty behavior,inefficiency of state-owned enterprises is higher.If the chairman is also the general manager,then the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises investment is higher;Since the board of supervisors and the efficiency of investment are negatively correlated,namely since the better situation of board of supervisors is,the lower non-efficiency investment degree is.(3)Investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises are not affected by the management incentive factors.Among them,the higher management level is,and the higher level of management equity incentive is,the lower non-efficiency investment degree is.At the same time,on-the-job consumption behavior can make up agency cost expectation gap and also reduce non-efficiency investment.Thirdly,effect of non-efficiency investment is important.Based on the information asymmetry,the principal-agent relationship and irrational line analysis,this thesis shows that non-efficiency investment has a significant performance effect and value effect.Empirical study shows:(1)Non-efficiency investment performance effect is remarkable.Non-efficiency investment degree of state-owned enterprises has significant negative linear influence on enterprise performance,but non-efficiency investment is in significantly U-type relationship with it and the lower the degree of lack of investment is,the better the performance is;Excessive investment level can make enterprise performance increase at first,then fell rapidly.The efficiency of investment value effect is remarkable.Non-efficiency investment of state-owned enterprises significantly and positively influences the enterprise value.But the efficiency of investment efficiency shows U-type relation,non-efficiency investment degree and state-owned enterprise value is negatively correlated.The influence of non-efficiency investment can decrease enterprise value at first,then improve the enterprise value at last.This thesis argues that this is because of evaluation principle of Richardson model and present situation of information asymmetry caused by capital market in China.