Research On The Relationship Of Competition And Cooperation Between The Civil Aviation Industry And The High-speed Rail Industry Based On The Game Perspective

In the process of modern industrial competition,more and more attention has been paid to the development of industry competition and cooperation.Different industries in the same area using their respective comparative advantages to conduct cooperation under competitive conditions are not only conducive to the expansion of the overall inter-industry income,but also make the comprehensive competitiveness of the industries themselves improved.The high-speed rail and civil aviation passenger products have a high degree of consistency,which has led to high-speed rail to form a strong challenge to civil aviation transportation.With the expansion of high-speed rail construction and the continuous development of the civil aviation industry,the competition between the two major industries in the passenger transport market will become more intense.At the same time,under the background of the Ministry of Transport's “majority system” reform and the strategy of vigorously developing “comprehensive transportation”,issues concerning the cooperation and coordinated development between the two have also received increasing attention.As the development of China's high-speed rail industry is unique,without systematic research on the premise of relevant research results,it is of great theoretical significance and practical significance to conduct systematic research on the cooperative relationship between the civil aviation industry and the high-speed rail industry.In view of that,this paper uses the discrete selection theory to quantitatively analyze passenger travel choice behavior and establishes the Logit passenger flow sharing model to study the rules of competition and cooperation between the civil aviation industry and the high-speed rail industry under different transport distances and different fares from the perspective of passenger microcosmic selection.Take the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed passenger traffic channel for empirical analysis.On this basis,using game theory-related knowledge,a dynamic game model for civil aviation high-speed railway with fare as the decision variable was established.The game behavior of civil aviation high-speed rail competition under the conditions of maximizing passenger revenue and maximizing social benefits was studied respectively.The game equilibrium solution and the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed passenger traffic channel as an example for empirical analysis.Through research,this paper concludes that:(1)The choice of passenger travel is the microfoundation of the civil aviation high-speed rail industry competition,and the fare is the main strategy tool of the civil aviation high-speed rail operator's competing game;(2)Under the condition of constant price With the increase of transportation distance,the market share of air transportation is also getting higher and higher,and the market share of high-speed rail transportation is getting lower and lower.The study found that 500-900 km is a significant distance between the high-speed rail and aviation competition game;(3)Under the conditions of market competition,After a competitive game,the competitive position of the civil aviation industry has been enhanced,and the competitive status of the high-speed rail industry has declined.In the competition game dominated by the government,the competitive position of the civil aviation industry has declined,and the competitive status of the high-speed rail industry has risen;overall,the civil aviation high-speed railway under the state of cooperation has been competitive.The total social benefit brought by the project is higher than the total operating income of the civil aviation high-speed railway under the conditions of market competition.