Research On The Excessive Investment Behavior Of Listed Companies In The Steel Industry With Excess Capacity

Investment as one of the "troika" to stimulate economic development,to enhance China's comprehensive strength has made important contributions.However,due to the influence of principal-agent conflict and information asymmetry,under the environment that China's capital market is not yet perfect,China's listed companies have frequently over-invested in the course of business.This phenomenon has great effect on the operating efficiency of listed companies And long-term development had a serious impact,and thus also exacerbated the problem of excess capacity.Overcapacity as a long-term existence of China's market economy,an economic phenomenon,has always constrained the healthy development of China's economy.Slightly overcapacity will show a decline in commodity prices,industrial product sales rate decreased,industry profits decline;when the problem of excess capacity is increasingly prominent,there will be increased industry losses,bank bad debts increased,the unemployment rate increased.Serious overcapacity will lead to economic turmoil,and even trigger the financial crisis.The industry is the most serious overcapacity,the longest duration is the steel industry,is considered a typical overcapacity industry,and sales margins in recent years gradually decline,by 2015 the industry-wide losses,the excessive investment in the steel industry and Excess capacity coexist situation.Therefore,this paper focuses on the overcapacity of the steel industry,discusses the over-investment behavior of listed companies in the steel industry.From the perspective of over-investment and corporate governance,this paper expounds the related theories such as principal-agent and information asymmetry.The author analyzes the causes of overinvestment and the corresponding governance mechanism.The reason for the coexistence of overcapacity and overinvestment can be analyzed from the conflict between the company and its stakeholders.The core of this problem lies in optimizing the corporate governance structure,The enterprise owners and managers,between the owner and the interests of its external investors to maximize the same degree of consistency.Then,through the construction of over-investment measurement method,selected research samples,mainly on China's steel industry listed companies in corporate governance in the internal governance mechanism,external governance mechanism for the relevant research.The results of this study show that the corporate governance mechanism of the listed companies in the steel industry has a certain degree of inhibition of overinvestment,but the unreasonable corporate governance structure will exacerbate the excessive investment level.In particular,the over-investment problem of state-owned enterprises is more serious than that of non-state enterprises.Although the board of directors has not found that the governance of the board of directors has an inhibitory effect on over-investment,the over-investment level of listed companies with unreasonable board size is higher;Equity incentive has a certain effect on the over-investment of listed companies,but the phenomenon of "zero-holding" is common,and non-state-owned enterprises are more effective than state-owned enterprises,and long-term debt Enhance the shareholders of listed companies to over-investment incentives,high levels of debt will also exacerbate excessive investment.