| In recent years,there is a scaled and diversified investment in listed companies which is inefficient,lead to impairment of enterprise value,become an important reason to restrict the sustainable development of listed companies.Under the modern corporate governance,equity structure determines a company related rights distribution in the process of decision-making,different equity structure reflects the different risks and benefit distribution mechanism,thus for shareholders and managers to form the different mechanism of incentive and constraint.Shareholders and managers influenced the investment decision—making efficiency to varying degrees under the different mechanism of incentive and constraint,and then the increase of enterprise value fundamentally depends on the efficiency of investment decisions,which creates a close correlation between equity structure and efficiency of investment decisions.Therefore,the research of equity structure and corporate investment efficiency make a great significance.The third plenary session of the 18 put forward a series of policy for state-owned enterprises represented by the mixed ownership reform,state-owned enterprises introducing private capital,its essence are to use private shareholders balances force to help the reform of state-owned enterprises,improve the market competitiveness of state-owned enterprises.But the cross shareholdings with different ownership nature highlights the balance problem under the mixed ownership,there has practical significance to put ownership balance problem into the equity structure theory,and then test the balance strength of private shareholders.This paper mainly discusses the mechanism which equity structure to the inefficient investment,select 2010-2013 medium-small size panel data of listed companies as the empirical sample.Research result shows that the non-efficiency investment behavior of public companies is common,state-owned enterprises are mainly expressed by over-investment,private enterprise mainly expressed by under-investment.Ownership concentration and the non-efficiency of investment appears "U" nonlinear type.Equity balance is negatively related with investment which is no efficiency,the higher the equity balance,the more beneficial to reduce the non-efficiency of investment.Under the condition of the high ownership concentration,ownership balance function is weak,and state identity balances shareholders will encourage the non-efficiency of investment,private balances shareholders can restrain the non-efficiency of the investment;In state-owned enterprises,the balance power of private shareholders is not significant,unable to exert inhibitory effect on the non—efficiency of investment.Based on the above research,some suggestions are put forward:first,balance centralized and decentralized on shareholding,optimize the stake.we believe that with certain concentration,at the same time by a few major shareholders holdings,containment and balances equity structure is the most beneficial to the company governance mechanism play,so as to achieve the purpose of improve investment efficiency.Second,introduce different nature of shareholders actively,the diversity shareholders give help to form the balances governance structure,make sure the goal of the enterprise value maximization.Special encourage the private shareholders to checks and balances,after private shareholders have a certain power of balance,in order to satisfy its profit-orientation instinct need,will practice some reform to improve the efficiency of enterprise management,also reduce the non-efficiency of the enterprises investment behavior.Finally,improve the balance power of private shareholders,advancing the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.The main reason that private shareholders can't play a role in state-owned enterprises is the voice of private shareholders restricted in state-owned enterprises,so to improve the ability and power of private shareholders is important especially?... |
PDF Full Text Request