Research On The Influence Of Holding Shareholder's Equity Pledge On Investment Efficiency

In recent years,as a new financing tool,equity pledge has emerged in the capital market,and its advantage of convenience and rapidity has been favored by the capital market,and for listed companies emergency "stock" to "flow" to help reduce the cost of loans while improving service efficiency,in the practical application of a wide range.However,equity pledge is not only convenient for the company,but also faces the risks of forced liquidation and transfer of control rights.Therefore,various scholars have extensively discussed the stock pledge of financing convenience and risk coexisting and its economic consequences.At present,the majority of scholars from earnings management,enterprise innovation and corporate value of three aspects of the impact of the pledge of equity.However,modern enterprises can realize value-added only by relying on investment activities,and only efficient investment can bring sustainable growth of cash flow and better growth of enterprises.Therefore,this paper takes the listed companies as the research object,combines the pledge of stock right and the investment behavior of enterprises,and deeply discusses the influence of the pledge of controlling shareholders on the investment behavior of enterprises.The whole analysis includes three aspects: First,it analyzes the impact of the pledge of controlling shareholders on the overall investment efficiency of listed companies.Secondly,according to the nature of property right,the enterprises are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Finally,according to the background of high concentration degree of stock ownership in Chinese enterprises,this paper takes stock ownership concentration degree as a adjusting variable,and analyzes whether stock ownership concentration degree can strengthen or weaken therelationship between stock ownership pledge and investment efficiency.In the part of empirical research,this paper takes the financial data of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen a shares from 2014 to 2018 as the data sample to do empirical research,according to the Richardson residual error model,the property rights are represented by dummy variables,and the ownership concentration is represented by the sum of the top 10 shareholders.The results show that:(1)there is a positive correlation between the pledge behavior of controlling shareholders and the inefficient investment,and the efficiency of the listed companies decreases with the increase of the pledge rate.(2)in non-state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between Equity Pledge and non-efficiency investment is more significant.(3)equity concentration enhances the positive correlation between Equity Pledge and inefficient investment.This paper supports that "tunneling effect" is greater than "benefit synergy effect".The empirical results of this paper not only expand the research status of the economic consequences of equity pledge,but also enrich the relevant literature on inefficient investment and add a new perspective on the impact of the individual behavior of controlling shareholders on corporate investment,and it is innovative to introduce the different property right nature and stock right structure into the study of stock right pledge.