Investment Efficiency Analysis Of State Owned Holding Listing Corporation

The efficiency of investment refers to the ratio of effective outputs of enterprise investment to the amount of consumed or occupied inputs.The increase of enterprise value fundamentally depends on its investment decision,which is based on the improvement of the investment efficiency.Therefore,the investment efficiency of an enterprise has a profound influence on the enhancement of its value.Now that the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprise is concerned with the operational efficiency of the national capital,it is directly related to the efficiency of the national economy.With the deepening of the state-owned enterprises' reform,the property right structure of state-owned enterprises has been gradually clear.And at the meanwhile,the supervision and management system of the state-owned assets has been improved step by step.But there is still a long way to go for the fact that the state-owned capital operation efficiency is still low,and the conveyance of internal resource and interest conducted by the state-owned group company through related party transactions is frequent,which have not only touched upon the allocation efficiency of state-owned resource,but also affected the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.The thirteenth Five-Year plan put forward the policy orientation of the reform of state-owned enterprises is to improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises,improve the efficiency of the state-owned capital,further improve the investment system reform of the state-owned enterprises.In view of this,the present research takes the state-owned holding listed corporation from 2007 to 2014 as the sample,and discusses the issues of state holding listed corporation investment efficiency from the perspective of related party transactions.Firstly,the research has analyzed the current situation of the related transaction and investment efficiency in terms of the strength of control rights,administrative properties of controlling shareholders and competitive environment,etc.Based on "efficiency improvement" and "resource transfer theory" to analyze the impact of related party transactions on the efficiency of investment.Secondly,on the basis of above analysis,empirical research on the impact of related party transactions on the investment efficiency.Finally,on the basis of the empirical results,the optimization strategy is put forward to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises,and promote the value of state-owned capital.The details are illustrated as follows:The first chapter mainly summarizes the background and significance of the proceeding research,and reviews the current research situation at home and abroad.The second chapter defines the concepts of investment efficiency and related party transactions,and makes a brief exposition of the principal agent theory,asymmetric information theory.The third chapter takes the state-owned holding listed corporation from 2007 to 2014 as the sample.A comparative analysis of the current situation of related party transactions and investment efficiency in terms of the strength of control rights,administrative properties of controlling shareholders and competitive environment,etc.The fourth chapter is the analysis of the influence that the related party transactions have on the investment efficiency of the state-owned holding listing corporation.Based on the theory of "efficiency promotion" and "resource transfer theory",and combined with corporate governance comprehensive analysis of related party transactions on the efficiency of investment effect.Empirical analysis is carried out in the fifth chapter so as to excavate the related party transactions influence on investment efficiency from various points of view which have already been discussed.The sixth chapter is the conclusion and suggestions.Through the above analysis,the main conclusions of this paper are as follows:1.Overall,the related party transaction is a general phenomenon between controlling shareholders of state owned holding listing corporation and listing corporation.What the controlling shareholders of listed corporation do whether "support" or "tunneling" would affect the internal resource allocation of the listed corporation,which will have an important influence on the investment efficiency of listed corporation.The related party transactions with different interest flows will result in different effects on investment efficiency.Supporting related party transactions will optimize the allocation of listing corporations' internal resources,which is conducive to promote investment efficiency;while tunneling related party transactions will lead to the outflow of listed corporations' resources,which would reduce the allocation efficiency of internal resources,and hinder the improvement of the investment efficiency.2.In terms of the administrative properties of controlling shareholders,in the provincial and local holding companies,the supporting related party transactions improves the allocation efficiency of the companies' internal resources,which has a positive role in promoting the efficiency of investment;while in the central holding companies,the supporting related transactions is not conducive to the improvement of the investment efficiency.Besides,in none of the central,provincial and local holding companies,tunneling related party transactions are conducive to improve the efficiency of investment.3.In the light of control strength,the supporting related party transaction is conducive to enhance the investment efficiency,in the weak control(less than 30%)and medium control(30%-50%)samples,the supporting related party transactions could improve the efficiency of investment obviously,while the promoting effect in strong control(more than 50%)samples is rather non-significant.Tunneling related party transactions is not conducive to enhance the investment efficiency,and the adverse effect is more significant in the medium and strong control samples.4.Adopting the HHI to measure the degree of competition in the industry,the present research categorizes the competitive environment high one and low one.In the high and low competition environment,related party transactions have different impact on investment efficiency.The supporting related party transactions are conducive to enhance the efficiency of investment,while the tunneling related party transactions are not.Thus,with the aid of the empirical studies,we can draw the conclusion that the different related party transactions will have different impact on investment efficiency,and there are disparities when situations are distinctive.Therefore,for different situations,the state-owned listing corporation should continuously optimize the controlling shareholder's behavior,and improve the investment efficiency so as to ensure the value of state-owned assets.