New Institutional Economics Analysis Of Chinese Migrant Workers' Labor Contracts

From January 1,2008,the new "Labor Contract Law" came into effect.It is a important law which is designed to regulate the labor contract,protect workers'legitimate rights and interests,and to build a harmonious labor relations.However,it did not do well,especially for our special labor groups-migrant workers.What is highly expressed is that in the "capital forced labor weak" social patterns,most migrant workers are not signed labor contracts with their employers,or employers choose to damage to the legitimate rights and interests of migrant workers.Labor contracts system has not been effectively implemented.So low signing rate,high rate of default has become the two major problems faced by migrant workers contract system.Analyzing the reasons for its existence has important practical value and significance for the protection of the legitimate rights of migrant workers and building a socialist harmonious society.Academia has no shortage of concern for migrant workers and research.This paper choose migrant workers' labor contract to study in another way.From the Perspective of New Institutional Economics the paper analyzes Migrant workers' characteristics how to affect the contractual relationship with the employer.The latest datas are selected to explain migrant workers labor contracts' current situation and problems,use cost Comparative analysis of income elaborate why migrant workers will face signing rate is low,the rate of default difficulties that affect the role of the labor contract reasons.Secondly,taking into account the liquidity problems of migrant workers,this paper use the incomplete information static game model to clarify the means of the employer for reasons of profit and costs,in this one-time transaction is in line to take deception to maximize their own interests motivation.This is also one of the reasons legitimate rights and interests of migrant workers vulnerable to abuse,which come out of a concrete solution to this problem.Finally,the relevant policies and proposals are promoted to solve the problem of migrant workers labor contracts.This paper argues that the main reasons for signing rate of migrant workers are mostly migrant workers with low educational level is not high,accepting less relevant skills training leading to its weak asset specificity,and therefore lack of incentives for employers contract system;contract weak awareness of migrant workers,trade unions such as the absence of third-party monitoring mechanism is an important factor contributing to private entrepreneurs breach,damage interests of migrant workers.So raise awareness of the rights of migrant workers,to enhance the training and increase the cost of the employer defaults,strengthen oversight mechanisms are effective third-party solutions.The innovation of this paper is selecting new institutional economics point of view,using transaction costs as an entry point,using asset specificity and transaction frequency as dimensions to study migrant workers' behavioral characteristics and its impact on contractual relationships.By the use of cost-benefit analysis points out that migrant workers labor contract system is not functioning properly because its inadequate incentives for employers.In addition,the paper take advantage of the game model to test the theoretical analysis.Of course,given angle and data analysis limit the scope of other aspects of the analysis in this paper.So there is inevitably inadequate.