Policy Burden,Marketization Degree And Allocation Efficiency Of Credit Resources

In the past,due to the government's administrative intervention in the market economy,enterprises have assumed a large number of policy burdens that are detrimental to economic efficiency.In turn,the government also provides loan support to companies by offering companies implicit guarantees or direct interventions in bank credit decisions.With the rapid development of the market economy,the non-state-owned economy has played an indispensable role in the national economy,and the government has gradually transferred some policy burdens to non-state-owned enterprises.Although it is possible to obtain bank loan support as a compensation after assuming a policy burden,the efficiency of the company's allocation of such loans is yet to be tested.Under the background of market-oriented reforms that China is advancing,how to handle the relationship between policy burden and the efficiency of the allocation of credit resources is related to the national economy and development.This is a major issue that needs urgent solution.This article adopts a combination of literature research and empirical analysis to study the relationship between policy burden,marketization,and the efficiency of credit resource allocation and its influencing factors.The main research content includes three parts: The first part is that the policy burden brings credit resources for the enterprise,and state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises are more prone to over-investment or under-investment in the use of this part of preferential credit resources;It is the influence of the level of marketization on the amount of corporate policy burden;the third part is the effect of marketization on the efficiency of the allocation of loans for enterprises to bear the policy burden.First of all,it theoretically analyzes the relationship between China's policy burden,bank credit resources and their allocation efficiency,marketization degree and policy burden,and the allocation efficiency of credit resources.Based on this,it proposes three hypotheses for this paper.An empirical test of the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company's data for 2008-2016 has yielded the following conclusions:(1)Regardless of the nature of property rights differences,companies can obtain bank credit resources due to their policy burden.However,compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises receive more credit resources;(2)The efficiency of corporate credit resource allocation is significantly negatively correlated with the credit resources obtained.That is,state-owned enterprises are more inclined to overinvest,while non-state-owned enterprises are more prone to underinvestment.(3)With the advancement of market-oriented reforms,the higher thelevel of marketization in the region in which companies are located,the less the policy burden.Compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises have a significantly higher allocation of credit resources;in low-market areas,this phenomenon is not obvious.In view of the above conclusions,this paper believes that it can be solved in the following aspects:(1)Accelerate the process of market-oriented reform and continuously improve the financial system.(2)Optimize government functions,build service-oriented government,and reduce government-to-business intervention.(3)The government should fully promote the reform of the mixed ownership system in state-owned enterprises and strengthen the checks and balances between other shareholders and state-controlled shareholders.(4)Establish and improve legal system construction and give full play to the legal resources allocation and optimization function.