Research On The Impact Of Institutional Investors' Shareholding On Senior Management Changes

Institutional investors were born in the 1960s and developed rapidly in the 1980s.By the 21st century,their role in corporate governance,corporate performance,and market stability has become increasingly prominent,but whether institutional investors can actively participate in governance,The stable market domestic and foreign scholars have been constantly controversial.Through reading the existing literature,it is found that most scholars start from several perspectives of earnings management,executive compensation,and dividend policy as the starting point for research.Few scholars use the perspective of senior management changes to explore institutions.The performance of investors in corporate governance is based on this.This article starts with the changes of senior executives,explores their impact on the relationship between corporate performance and executive turnover,and enriches relevant research literature.Based on domestic and foreign research results,principal-agent theory,and shareholder activism-related theories.this article proposes hypotheses and does the following empirical work:analyzing the impact of institutional investors on the relationship between performance and executive turnover,and further classifying institutional investors as Independent and non-independent,stable and transactional,analyzing the impact of different types on the relationship between performance and senior management changes.Taking the 6819 samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as empirical data for empirical analysis,this paper finds:(1)Corporate performance is negatively related to changes in senior management.Institutional investors' shareholdings will increase the negative impact of corporate performance on executive turnover,indicating that the higher the institutional investor's shareholding ratio,the higher level of corporate executives will suffer from poor performance.The greater the possibility of change,the higher shareholding ratio makes them pay more attention to the long-term value of the company,and it can indeed play an active role in participating in corporate governance.(2)Different types of institutional investors also have different influences on the relationship between corporate performance and senior management changes.Among them,independent and stable institutional investors will enhance the negative impact of corporate performance on executives' changes.They will pay more attention to the long-term value of the company and are willing to supervise the management.Non-independent and transactional institutional investors have no significant impact on the relationship between performance and senior management changes.Their performance in participating in corporate governance is not satisfactory,and there is even a possibility of collusion with management.(3)Enterprises with different property rights,institutional investors have different effects on the relationship between corporate performance and changes in senior management.Compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises,institutional investors,independent and stable institutional investors The impact on the relationship between corporate performance and executives' changes is even more pronounced.They have less restraint when exercising their supervisory power and have more room to play a supervisory role.This study can broaden the research field of institutional investors acting on corporate governance,enrich the literature on the research of heterogeneous institutional investors,and also provide some reference value for the reform of state-owned enterprises by dividing the nature of property rights,and finally,it provides suggestions for the management of institutional investors for relevant management departments.