The Analysis Of The Case Of The Equity Conflict Between Vankeand Baoneng

In recent years,with the frequent occurrence of corporating the enterprise control rights and the continuous deepening understanding of the problems related to control,the study of the enterprise control right has been paid more and more attention in academia and enterprise practice.This classic case about the control rights between Vanke and Baoneng is a significant event in the development of China's capital market and also has aroused widespread concern in the domestic public.Therefore,the paper analyzes the reasons and the essence of the control rights between Vanke and Baoneng through the literature combing,theoretical analysis,using the method of case study and the perspective of separation of power.this case also provide a reference to manage a enterprise well,it is of great significance for Vanke Group itself and the management of other listed companies.First,the paper introduces the background and related literature and makes a comprehensive description about the theory of separation of powers,principal-agent and the contention of control right.Otherwise,The whole case is also described on the basis of theoretical bedding and detailedly introduce the equity changes in the process of contending the Vanke's control right with the basic background of Vanke Group.Second,four aspects that include the Vanke Group business management impact,the shareholders of the General Assembly and the board of directors of the power distribution,the stabilization of the ownership of the market circulation and management rights and capital management and the effective combination of the real economy analyze the issue caused by the contention of equity and by using the idea of game theory the relative separation of the two rights is the best equilibrium result of Vanke Group and the relevant inspiration is obtained in the case of the complete separation of the two powers through collecting related data and information of the equity contention.Finally,The conclusion is drawn that the operator of Vanke's listed companies should have certain ownership control ability to stabilize the company's business philosophy and social responsibility and two aspects including the company and regulators make specific recommendations for the stabilization of management in the listed companies.