Research On Contract Governance Of Residual Control Rights Allocation In PPP Project

During the period of rapid development of the global economy,in the process,all countries in the world have focused on the construction of public infrastructure.The problems brought about by the government's large-scale construction of public infrastructure soon surfaced-a serious lack of funds.As the public infrastructure is more to provide people with a more convenient life,and the capital gains are less.Therefore,the government has to seek financial assistance from social capital to develop public infrastructure.This model of public-private partnership operation is called Public-Private-Partnership(hereafter referred to as PPP mode).As early as the 1980s,China has focused on applying the BOT model to infrastructure construction and public services.China's earliest PPP project was the Guangxi Laibin B power plant project successfully piloted in the 1990s.Since then,in order to further promote the development of the PPP model,China has issued a number of support policies,from the "Notice on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Absorption of Foreign Investment by BOT" in 1995 to the "Promotion of the Use of Government and Social Capital Cooperation Models in 2014".Notice of the problem.With the strong support and continuous improvement of relevant policies,it has laid a solid foundation for the further development of PPP model in China.However,due to China's special national conditions and lack of relevant experience of government and social capital,there are still many problems in the PPP model.Among them,the problem of the distribution of residual control rights is one of the biggest problems of government and social capital disputes at this stage,and also an important factor affecting the performance of PPP projects.In addition,PPP projects are generally large public infrastructures such as hydropower plants,highways,sewage treatment plants,etc.Therefore,the general construction period of PPP projects is very long and the construction technology is also complicated.Therefore,it is difficult for government departments to conduct real-time supervision of social capital or pay more costs to verify their construction technology and management capabilities.This has led to problems such as information asymmetry and moral hazard in social capital.Therefore,the allocation of residual control rights from the perspective of contract governance is of great significance to improve the performance of contract management.This paper studies the contract governance of the residual control right allocation of PPP projects,and believes that the residual control rights should be reasonably configured between government departments and social capital.Because the interests of the two sides of the transaction are different,the government departments pursue the quality of infrastructure or public services,that is,the maximization of social welfare;social capital for self-interest considerations may lead to the problem of opportunistic behavior.On this basis,this paper analyzes the residual control rights through three aspects.Firstly,it analyzes the problem of adverse selection of social capital side due to information asymmetry in the bidding stage before PPP contract signing,and adopts the menu configuration method according to social capital.The term of the franchise period reported by the party analyzes the relationship between the franchise period of the PPP project and the comprehensive management ability of the social capital,so that the hidden private information is exposed as public information,thereby alleviating the problem of adverse selection to a certain extent.The purpose of contract governance.Secondly,it analyzes the moral hazard problem driven by the social capital side after the signing of the PPP contract.Through the mathematical modeling method,it is concluded that the contractually agrees to allocate more control rights to the social capital side,which can promote The degree of effort has improved the quality of PPP projects to a certain extent,thereby improving the performance of contracts.Finally,the analysis of the stage after the signing of the PPP contract is due to the lack of trust between the government department and the social capital,and the social capital party's special investment in the PPP project is insufficient,resulting in the degradation of the quality of the infrastructure or service and the service life.Shorten and other issues.Through the method of mathematical modeling,the remaining control rights of PPP projects are configured.Under certain conditions,correspondingly changing the proportion of the remaining control rights of government departments or social capital will make social capital increase the input level of its specific assets.Therefore,to some extent,the problem of insufficient investment in special investment is alleviated,and the purpose of contract management is achieved.Then through the case of Jiangxi Xiajiang Water Conservancy PPP project,combined with the theoretical analysis of the previous article,analyzes the existing problems of contract governance from the perspective of the distribution of residual control rights under PPP mode,and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.The main innovations of this paper are as follows:Firstly,contract management of PPP from three aspects of social capital opportunism behavior,improve the performance of PPP contract,and provide new ideas for further promoting the development of PPP projects in China.Secondly,compared with the empirical research on the PPP project by scholars at present,this paper establishes a mathematical model and qualitatively analyzes the distribution of residual control rights.Finally,on the issue of adverse selection,this paper makes the social capital expose its real management situation through the way of menu configuration,and solves the problem of adverse selection to a certain extent,and provides a theoretical basis for the practice of contract management of PPP projects.