The Research On Relativity Between The Arrangement Of Residual Control & Residual Claim In SOEs And Governance Efficiency

As a mechanism of corporate ownership arrangement, the main idea of corporate governance is to distribute residual control & residual claim symmetrically by a property (human capital and material capital) contract. In this way a corporate can improve its efficiency. It was to give managers residual control rights that we carried out the policy of enterprise managing independently, and give them residual claim rights that contract system and profit sharing were fulfiled. At present, the essence of building modern corporate system is to assign residual rights efficiently among all levels of governament and enterprise. Desining one mode of residual rights arrangement is exigent due to the absence of a unique corporate governance and complexity of SOEs in a transition-economy.Based on theories of property rights, corporate governance, modern enterprise and system transformation, this paper mainly discusses these matter as follows by theory description and experiential analysis :1.Evolvement of SOEs' residual rights arrangementFrom decentralizing power and giving up profits to enterprises, contract system to stock-holding system, the change of residual rights in SOEs has influenced corporate governance efficiency mostly. However, residual rights have not been held by enterprises in deed or not been arranged symmetrically.2.Relativity between the arrangement of residual control & residual claim in SOEs and governance efficiencyWe research the effect mechanism of SOEs' residual rights arrangement on corporate governance efficiency, then build multi-linear regression analysis equations to observe their relativity. As far as the residual contral is concerned, the proportion of state-owned shares & non-current shares and CEO duality have negative effect while independent director and worker superintendent have positive effect on governance efficiency. For residual claim, low proportion of management and workers holding shares do not influence governance efficiency remarkably, but there is a remarkable negative-correlative effect between asset-liability ratio and governance efficiency. In spite of those, the multi-linear regression analysis has not found a systematic correlative relation between residual rights arrangement and corporate governance efficiency. 3.Assumption on SOEs' residual rights arrangementThis paper puts forward a new mode of SOEs' residual rights arrangement whichcombinates "the lowest governance cost rule" with "the biggest governance income rule". The former requires that giving corporate ownership to human capital owners and making decision-makers become special elements owners, while the latter requires giving corporate ownership to scarce resources owners & proprietary elements owners, and making special elements owners share corporate ownership. The perfect state is an equilibrium of the two rules. From the inner & outer governance, some guarantee measures are given based on SOEs current situation analysis and conclusions of experiential research.This research enriches the academic contents of SOEs' governance structure innovation meanwhile provides some theory & data foundation for relational departments to make decisions.