Research On Optimizing The Equity Incentive Of State-owned Holiding Listed Companies Under The Background Of Mixed Reform

Equity incentive plays an important role in improving corporate governance structure,establishing a reasonable talent system and ensuring stable growth of performance.Throughout the global capital market,equity incentive has been widely used by enterprises all over the world,and achieved good results.However,due to our unique economic system and the late start of the capital market,equity incentives are not widely used in Listed Companies in China,and they are still in the initial stage.This paper first chooses Shanghai Jahwa as a case study,and finds that Shanghai Jahwa has three equity incentives under the background of mixed reform,but the effect of equity incentives is different,which leads to the thinking of whether the nature of property rights will affect equity incentives.Then it reviews the incentives of equity incentives,including equity incentives and market reaction,enterprise performance,contract structure,property rights nature and so on.According to the relevant literature at home and abroad,the following four issues are further identified:(1)There are various motivations for the implementation of equity incentives.What motivation is Shanghai nationalization based on to decide the implementation of equity incentives?Does Shanghai Jahwa solve the above problems through equity incentive?(2)Will the nature of property rights affect equity incentive schemes?How does the nature of property right affect equity incentive scheme?(3)Does equity incentive have the same effect on state-owned enterprises and private enterprises?(4)As a typical model of state-owned enterprise reform,what successful experience does Shanghai Jahwa have in equity incentive?Deficiencies?After identifying the problems,to solve the above problems,an analytical framework composed of motivation,optimization measures and effect of equity incentive implementation is established,and then the above-mentioned framework is used to analyze the case of Shanghai nationalization.Firstly,the study finds that Shanghai nationalization is the motivation of equity incentive implementation based on the dilemma of talents and the intensification of industry competition.Secondly,it finds the evidence that the nature of property rights affects equity incentive,which shows that the equity incentive scheme in the period of state-owned enterprises has obvious welfare color,the conditions of granting(exercising)are low,and the incentive objects are concentrated in the core management.However,in the private period after the safe entry into the ownership,the conditions for granting(exercising)equity incentives are more reasonable,and the objects of incentives are more scientific.Finally,the effect of equity incentive implementation is evaluated from three dimensions:financial performance,market reaction and personnel structure.Through case analysis,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Equity incentive helps enterprises to improve performance and improve the talent structure.(2)From the perspective of contract structure,the nature of property rights mainly affects equity incentives through regulatory channels.(3)The effect of equity incentive in private period is better than that in state-owned period.Finally,this paper evaluates Shanghai nationalization,analyses its successful experience and shortcomings,puts forward optimization suggestions for Shanghai nationalization case,and summarizes the significance of other enterprises'reference and policy recommendations for regulatory agencies.In the policy recommendations,four suggestions are put forward:promoting the mixing of state-controlled listed companies,strengthening the supervision of information disclosure of equity incentives,distinguishing the focus of supervision between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,and speeding up the construction of effective capital market.