Connected-party Guarantees Of Private Listed Companies And Firm Performance

Mixed-ownership reform is still a hot topic of concern to people form all walks of life.The reform requires the realization of cross-shareholdings of state-owned capital,collective capital,and non-public capital,and the mixture of state-owned capital and social capital at the level of property rights.After a detailed analysis of this policy,it is found that the main body of reform is state-owned business,which Require them to actively inject private non-public capital.However,for those enterprises that use private capital as the controlling shareholder,whether they should inject state-owned capital should not pay enough attention.In addition,the governance of private listed companies is still acute.The management system of private enterprises is not perfect,with " Close or alienated" and "personal" interpersonal relationship.This kind of private enterprise environment lacks the screening of the lower management staff and the infusion of corporate culture.It is impossible to arrange and train employees scientifically so that the insiders can carry out various kinds of “edge ball” and even illegal transactions,such as related purchase and sale or related guarantee transactions.Other small and medium shareholders are unable to detect problems and risks in time,making external stakeholders more vulnerable to unknown losses.Then,different from the research subject of mixed ownership reform,the introduction of state-owned capital participation in private listed companies can play an "invisible hand" to reduce unreasonable related guarantee transactions,and generate the effect like equity diversification after the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises to promote corporate performance.? This is the main content of this paper.Therefore,based on the related guarantees as the starting point to study its impact on corporate performance,this paper joins the adjustment role of state-owned shares,explores whether private enterprises should keep up with the pace of mixed ownership,actively adjust the ownership structure to improve governance,and further research on the degree of marketization and government intervention,what is the difference in the role of such state-owned equity participation? This article provides a new perspective on the direction of mixed ownership reform.The article first sorts out the relevant literature of the research object to understand the existing research direction.Secondly,using normative research methods,theoretical summary of information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,externality theory,informed right theory and effective market theory,informed right theory and effective market theory.Under the background of mixed ownership reform,with the starting point of related party transaction research,In the traditional equity balance,with the state-owned capital participation in private listed companies as the research object,the paper analyzes the relationship between related guarantee transactions,company performance and state-owned capital participation in related party transactions.In the end,this paper uses the empirical research method to study the privately-held listed companies of A-shares from 2010 to 2016 in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange,and screens the processing data and regression analysis,the empirical results show that:(1)It is found that the related transactions of private listed companies do have a negative impact on the performance of enterprises,as the previous scholars have studied;(2)After splitting the related guarantee transactions,related purchases and sales and related services in related party transactions,it is found that the related guarantees will accelerate the generation of business risks,and the related purchase and sale transactions may have the effect of promoting enterprise performance;(3)The introduction of state-owned capital participation will inhibit the plundering of small and medium-sized shareholders of related guarantees,and play a role in promoting related performance in related transactions,but this effect does not play a significant role in the basic purchase and sale activities.(4)Finally,with the degree of regional marketization and the intensity of government intervention,different effects are achieved.In areas with high degree of marketization and low levels of government intervention,the role of state-owned shares is more significant.The conclusion confirms to some extent that the reform of the internal equity nature of private capital will have a positive effect on the enterprise itself.The main contribution of this paper is to break through the traditional perspective and study different types of connected transactions.and find that the current types of connected transactions have changed with the change of capital market,which proves that the research on connected transactions should be adjusted according to the actual situation;In addition,research has circumvented the traditional research company governance focused on: shareholder shareholding ratio,family business,sound internal control and traditional political connections.Based on the perspective of the impact of the introduction of state-owned shares on corporate governance in the context of mixed ownership reform,it is necessary to study whether this governance can be reversed.Due to the trend of deteriorating corporate performance caused by related guarantees,this new way of thinking for the formulation of relevant legal policies for regulating the related guarantees and internal equity optimization of private listed companies,to promote the "market plays a decisive role in resource allocation" and reduce government intervention Policy support.