Research On The Impact Of Ownership Balance On Corporate Governance Effectiveness Under The Control Right Contest

Since China's share-trading reform in 2005,the capital market has developed rapidly,and some companies with scattered shares have suffered from external investors.The ownership structure is the fundamental problem of researching corporate governance,and the effectiveness of corporate governance not only affects the efficiency of corporate governance,but also closely relates to the improvement of financial performance.In recent years,the shareholding structure of listed companies in China has undergone multiple changes,the characteristics of equity distribution have been concentrated from concentration,and the phenomenon of control rights has begun to emerge.In response to the frequent control of listed companies in the capital market,the theoretical and practical circles have conducted in-depth discussions and research,mainly focusing on the agency issues and interests between major shareholders and minority shareholders and between company shareholders and company management.conflict.However,the competition for control of many listed companies in China recently has existed among the major internal shareholders,and theoretical research on such phenomena is relatively rare.In the process of competing for equity,major shareholders will have a direct impact on the company's equity allocation,and the control rights will balance each other,which will further affect the effectiveness of corporate governance.Based on the above background,this paper adopts the single case research method,selects the case of the control competition of Dongfang Yinxing in 2012-2017,and combs the equity of the two major shareholders based on the research theory of control rights competition,equity checks and balances and corporate governance and its effectiveness.The conflict process analyzes the impact of equity competition on the company's shareholding structure and how to form equity checks and balances,and deeply studies the impact of equity checks and balances on corporate governance effectiveness in the context of control rights competition.In the evaluation of corporate governance effectiveness,this paper draws on the evaluation ideas of Nankai Corporate Governance Index,and selects representative corporate financial performance indicators,from the perspective of corporate governance efficiency and financial performance qualitative and quantitative analysis of control rights in the context of competition The impact of equity checks and balances on the effectiveness of corporate governance makes the evaluation results more comprehensive and objective.Finally,the paper also puts forward some practical suggestions on how to avoid the influence of the vicious control rights competition in the capital market.The shareholder conflict of Dongfang Yinxing is a typical case in the corporate governance of private enterprises in China.The research results of this paper show that the major shareholder will form a balance of ownership structure in the process of equity competition,but this equity balance will not improve the efficiency of corporate governance,and even negatively affect the business performance of the company.Through the research of this paper,on the one hand,it sorts out the mechanism of the impact of equity checks and balances on corporate governance in the context of control rights competition;on the other hand,it comprehensively evaluates the impact of control rights competition on enterprises,and how to improve corporate governance mechanisms and avoid capital.The occurrence of vicious control rights in the market has important implications.