The Case Study Of Interest Encroachment Of Controlling Shareholder Under Equity Pledge

In recent years,under the background of the tight capital,more and more controlling shareholders of listed enterprises choose equity pledge for financing.On June 15,2018,3349 of the 3527 A-shares listed companies had pledged shares,accounting for more than 95percent;the total market capitalization of listed companies was 6.27 trillion yuan,accounting for 10.11 percent of the total market capitalization of A-shares.There are not only a large number of listed companies that had pledged shares,but also the overall equity pledge market value is high.The equity pledge can make use of the stock right without transferring the control of the controlling shareholders and obtain the convenience of financing;The equity pledge can also avoid the restricted selling period,and does not prevent the controlling shareholders from refinancing the restricted shares,so the A-share listed companies are generally involved in the equity pledge financing.Taking the "Baoqianli CO.LTD " listed company as a case,this paper analyzes the reason of the equity pledge of its controlling shareholder,the abnormal behavior of the controlling shareholder after the equity pledge,the adverse effect on the financial performance of the listed company and so on.This paper also tries to explain the relationship between the equity pledge of the controlling shareholder and the damage to the interest of the listed company,or the influence of the former on the latter.Based on the change of the "old regulation" to the "new regulation" of the equity pledge after January 12,2018,this paper analyzes the reason why the controlling shareholder of the listed company is inclined to the equity pledge to finance before the issuance of the equity pledge "new regulation".The case analysis shows that the equity pledge will increase the degree of the control and the right of cash flow,and reduce the cost of the controlling shareholder to carry out the interest of the listed company,especially when the controlling shareholder makes a high-proportion share pledge,it may be more motivated to encroach on the interests of the listed company.In this case,after holding the stock right pledge,the controlling shareholder increases the interest and occupation of the "to keep a thousand miles" by means of the illegal guarantee,the use of the account receivable and the funds of the listed company and the like,so that the long-distance fund chain is broken,and the operation performance of the final company is greatly deteriorated.