Research On The Motivation And Economic Consequences Of Benefits Expropriation Under The Equity Pledge Financing Of The Controlling Shareholders Of Listed Companies

The difficulty of financing has always been the biggest obstacle in the development of private enterprises in our country.The regulatory authorities have frequently issued policies to create new ways to financing for private enterprise in recent years.But the result was not quite satisfactory,for their low qualifications and high risks.What's worse,the credit policy of commercial banks has tightened,and the review of standard financing products such as stocks and bonds has become more stringent.However,the rapid development of equity pledge financing has brought private listed companies hope.Every coin has two sides,the risks of equity pledge financing can not be ignored.On the one hand,and the high proportions of controlling shareholder's equity pledge financing,not only there is a risk of transfer of control rights due to the stock price fell,but also there are systemic risks caused by the overall market downturn,on the other hand,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge,especially the high proportion of equity pledge will increase the second category of listed companies.The equity pledge will deepen the separation of control shareholders and cash flow rights,thereby enhancing their motives for profit encroachment.In addition,the controlling shareholder recovers the investment cost,and reduce the cost of its encroachment through equity pledge financing,resulting in more serious problems of encroachment.This paper studies the issue of interest encroachment under the controlling shareholder pledge financing.The full text of this article consists of six chapters.The results of this case analysis shows that:(1)The motives generated by the controlling shareholder's equity pledge interest mainly comes from two aspects.On the one hand,the controlling shareholder recovers the investment cost due to the equity pledge,which reduces the cost of encroachment,and the equity pledge aggravates the controlling shareholder.The degree of separation of the two powers increases the possibility of seeking private interests in control.On the other hand,the size of the controlling shareholder is also an important factor.Poor internal control environment,lacking of ownership of other investors,and the squander's neglect to restrict the behavior of controlling shareholders may also become a booster for the interests of controlling shareholders.(2)The controlling shareholder's equity pledge interests are diversified in a variety of ways,but mainly use the control rights still retained to transfer the high-quality assets after the equity pledge.Finally,they will give up control rights and abscond with money,leaving worthless equity.(3)By comparing the degree of interest encroachment before and after the controlling shareholder's equity pledge,we found that after the equity pledge,the controlling shareholder's interest encroachment degree was obviously deepened,and the controlling shareholder's equity pledge ratio is higher,and the degree of interest encroachment is deeper.(4)The consequences of the encroachment of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge interests are very serious,such as the transfer of control rights,the reduction of company value,and the loss of interests of small and medium shareholders.