Analysts' Attention,Agency Costs And Quality Of Information Disclosure

Information is the soul of the capital market.High-quality information disclosure is conducive to reducing the degree of information asymmetry between companies and investors in the capital market,improving the efficiency of capital allocation in the capital market,and promoting the healthy and orderly development of the capital market.Therefore,the quality of information disclosure has an important impact and role in the development of the capital market.However,the quality of information disclosure in China's capital market is still not optimistic,and information disclosure fraud cases still exist,and the quality of information disclosure needs to be improved.In recent years,securities analysts play an increasingly important role in the capital market.One view is that analyst's attention directly and indirectly monitors the listed company's business activities and management's behavior,and can inhibit the manager's information manipulation behavior.Another view is that analysts' attention put a lot of pressure on the management of listed companies,and managers are motivated to participate in earnings management and manipulate information to cater to analysts' forecasts.So,the article will study whether analysts can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,and focus on the impact of analysts on the path to the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.Since the role of the analyst is influenced by the external environment of the company,and the rule of law environment in different regions of China is quite different,it is further analyzed whether the rule of law environment affects the relationship between analysts' attention and the quality of information disclosure.Based on the principal-agent theory,the signal transmission theory and efficient market theory as the theoretical basis,this paper analyzes the impact of securities analysts as the company's important external supervision and governance mechanism on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies by reading a large number of relevant literatures and using the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis.Because the existence of agency problems makes managers and major shareholders have incentives to manipulate information,the article focuses on how analysts' attention affect the quality of information disclosure by affecting agency costs and further studies the regulation of the role of the rule of law in this intermediary.The article selects all the A-share listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2017 as a sample,and builds a mediation model and mediation model with adjustments.The empirical test examines the relationship between analysts' concerns and the quality of information disclosure,as well as the intermediary and regulatory role of agency costs and the rule of law environment.The empirical results show that:(1)Analysts' attention significantly improves the quality of information disclosure of listed companies;(2)Analysts' attention significantly reduces the cost of two types of agents;(3)Agency costs play a mediating role in the relationship between analysts' attention and the quality of information disclosure;(4)The rule of law environment negatively regulates the influence of analysts on the quality of information disclosure and the first half of the intermediary path.That is,it negatively regulates the analyst's attention to the improvement of the quality of information disclosure and the reduction of agency costs.In this paper,analysts' attention,agency costs and quality of information disclosure are included in the same model for research.The research on agency cost can demonstrate that analyst's attention to the mechanism of the quality of information disclosure.That is,the analyst's attention that this external governance mechanism can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies by affecting the agency problem of the company.At the same time,it can provide ideas for the listed company to improve its governance mechanism,reduce agency problems,and improve the quality of information disclosure.Further research found that analysts are more concerned about the role of supervision and governance in areas with poor rule of law environment.Since the construction of the rule of law environment in the region is not completed in a short period of time,areas with relatively low levels of rule of law can make up for the absence of the rule of law through analysts and other external non-rule of law.Therefore,the study in this paper is conducive to improving the internal and external governance mechanism of the company and improving the quality of information disclosure of the company.