The Study On The Effect Of Securities Analysts Coverage On Earnings Management Of Listed Companies

The earnings management behavior of listed companies has always been closely watched by academics and practitioners.Behavioral finance theory believes that the information gap created by earnings management can help managers cover up their self-interested behaviors,and at the same time interfere with investor decisions and damage investors' interests.Excessive earnings management has become a tool for management to seek personal gain,which has damaged corporate value.Earnings management of listed companies not only arises between existing managers and owners,but also conflicts of interest between potential shareholders and existing shareholders can lead to earnings management behavior.Traditional internal governance with a focus on contractual relationships is difficult to form effective constraints on earnings management behavior.Some studies began to study earnings management from the perspective of external market participants such as institutional investors,auditors,and securities analysts.It is believed that external market participants' attention to the company increases the risk of exposure to management opportunistic behavior,which in turn drives management.Prudently treat company information and alleviate agency problems.However,there is little focus on the literature and results of earnings management from the perspective of securities analysts.Therefore,from the perspective of external supervision of analysts,the research on earnings management has both theoretical and practical significance.As an information intermediary in the capital market,analysts can improve the efficiency of information transmission,ease information asymmetry,and thus fundamentally reduce the space for earnings management.Therefore,this paper attempts to deeply study the impact mechanism of analysts' economic behavior on management earnings management behavior.Through the empirical test of the relevant data of A-share listed companies in 2013-2017,the hypothesis test is carried out from the analysis of analysts' attention,earnings forecast and cash flow forecasting,and the hypothesis test of accrued,real and classified transfer earnings management.The economic behavior of securities analysts interacts with corporate earnings management.Secondly,the model empirically tests the existence of complementary or substitution effects between earnings management methods.The participation of analysts also has an impact on the complementary or substitution effects.Analysts focus on specific recommendations for addressing earnings management issues.The conclusions of this paper indicate that(1)the economic behavior of securities analysts can restrain the enterprise's accruals and real earnings management behaviors well,but it has a limited effect on classified transfer earnings management.(2)There is a complementary effect between accruals and real earnings management,and there is a substitution effect between accrual and classified transfer earnings management.The complementary effect of analysts' attention accruals and real earnings management will be transformed into substitution.The contribution of this paper lies in: First,from the study of securities analyst behavior how to ease earnings management,verify the effectiveness of the external supervision mechanism of securities analysts.Second,it verifies the interrelationship between different means of earnings management and the governance effect of securities analysts on mutual impact earnings management.