The Impact Of Venture Capital And Analyst Concern On Earnings Management Of Listed Companies

Venture capital,as an important "catalyst" for the development of China's capital market,participates in high-growth high-tech companies through equity investment,and uses its own funds and professional skills to help enterprises achieve rapid development and obtain high investment returns.In order to meet listing conditions,deal with listing supervision and follow-up financing,companies have incentives to conduct earnings management.On the one hand,based on the "authentication supervision theory",venture capital actively participates in corporate operations and monitors the company's earnings management after it has invested in the company.on the other hand,due to the"chasing fame" effect,the participation of venture capital may allow companies to conduct earnings management.As an independent external supervisor,securities analysts force management to treat company information prudently and effectively reduce the company's earnings management space.What kind of"chemical reaction" will be caused by the combined effect of the two external supervision mechanisms on the company's earnings management is the focus of this article.This article selects the data of China's GEM companies from 2009 to 2017,using the modified Jones model to measure accrued earnings management and the Roychowdhury model to measure true earnings management.At the same time,we collected relevant data on venture capital and analyst attention,established a multiple linear regression model,studied the impact of venture capital on corporate earnings management after the IPO,and verified the moderating effect of analyst attention on the relationship between the two.The empirical results show that:(1)After the successful IPO of the GEM company,the continued holding of venture capital has a significant promotion effect on corporate accruals and true earnings management,which validates the"chasing name" effect.(2)Analysts focus on inhibiting the company's accrual earnings management,but instead promote real earnings management.The reason is that it is easy for analysts to monitor the less concealed accrual earnings management,and at the same time,based on the "stress" effect,managers are forced to shift their manipulation to true earnings management.(3)Analysts' concerns have weakened the "chasing name" effect of venture capital on accrual earnings management of enterprises,but promoted true earnings management of enterprises.(4)Further research shows that the joint venture capital and venture capital shareholding significantly promote the earnings management of the enterprise,and at the same time,the research finds that there is a common and complementary relationship between the two types of earnings management.This article studies the impact of venture capital on two types of earnings management after IPO,and analyzes and verifies the moderating role of analysts'concerns.It not only enriches the mechanism overview and impact research conclusions of the two external supervision mechanisms on earnings management,but also provides policy recommendations from the perspectives of venture capital institutions,securities analyst development,market supervision mechanisms and investor education.