| At present,Chinese economic development has encountered a bottleneck period,and the contradictions and conflicts between the real economy and the virtual economy are increasingly intensified.Based on this reality,this paper,on the basis of reviewing existing domestic and foreign literatures,selected the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2017 as the sample,and investigated the relationship between management myopia,assets financialization and innovation performance from the two approaches of management meeting its own interests and catering to shareholders.Furtheermore,the sample was divided into high-tech enterprises and state-owned enterprises for testing,and the robustness test was carried out through substitution variable measurement index and intermediary effect test method.It is found that when the executive compensation incentive is at a higher level or short-term institutional investors are in a stronger position among shareholders,the management has a stronger incentive to arbitrage and is more likely to hold higher financial assets in order to continuously obtain higher compensation returns or cater to short-sighted institutional investors,thus squeezing out innovation performance.Through comparative analysis,it is found that the innovation performance of high-tech enterprises and private enterprises is deeply influenced by the executives' needs to meet their own interests.Non-high-tech enterprises and state-owned enterprises are more influenced by whether executives cater to short-sighted institutional shareholders.Assets Financialization has a significant mediating effect in the high-quality innovation output sample.In this regard,this paper believes that the optimization can be carried out from the aspects of regulating the development of the financial industry and the real estate industry,improving the innovation incentive system,optimizing the executive compensation system,and introducing strategic institutional investors. |
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