The Influence And Path Of The Seperation Of Control Rights And Cash Flow Rights On Enterprise Values

Under the modern enterprise system arrangement,control rights and cash flow rights are the two most basic rights forms of company equity.The cash flow right means that the company's shareholders have the right to participate in the company's cash flow distribution due to the payment of property.The control right is the power to lead the company's operation and decision-making.The control rights and cash flow rights are inherently derived from shareholder ownership,and the allocation should be uniform..However,in recent years,with the increasing shareholding and complexity of corporate shareholding and shareholding structure,under the pyramid structure,cross-shareholding,and double-shares,the controlling shareholder's control rights and cash flow rights are gradually separated.The economic consequences of separation have become the focus of domestic and foreign literature.On the one hand,when listed companies are not well managed or face financial crisis,the pyramid structure,cross-shareholding and other shareholding methods are conducive to controlling shareholders to transfer assets to the listed company to help them tide over the difficulties,other shareholders can also profit,control shareholders Enterprises have a certain "support effect." On the other hand,the separation of control rights and cash flow rights does not match the decision-making behavior of controlling shareholders with the consequences of decision-making.The private interests that control shareholders take when transferring company assets and encroaching on company profits far exceed the cost paid for this.The “tunneling effect” of shareholders often damages the legitimate interests of other shareholders and even “short-cuts” enterprises.It can be seen that the impact of the separation of research control rights and cash flow rights on corporate value is of great significance for improving the governance ability of listed companies,protecting other shareholders' rights and regulating the development of capital markets.More importantly,from the perspective of causality,the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is not directly related to corporate value.Enterprise value is the result of business operations.Controlling shareholders to implement the motive of encroachment requires specific ways to operate.Therefore,the exploration of the path of control and the separation of cash flow rights on the value of enterprises is necessary to prevent and control shareholders from implementing the motives of encroachment and standardizing business operations.Based on this,this paper firstly sorts out related literatures at home and abroad,and clarifies the definition and source of cash flow rights by clarifying the intrinsic source,power essence and power content of control rights,and theoretically expounding the necessity of the control rights and the right of cash flow rights.And the consequences of the separation of control rights and cash flow rights.Secondly,this paper draws on the research method of LLSV et al.,and uses excess control right to define the degree to which control rights exceed cash flow rights.After data screening,5052 observations were used as panel data to empirically prove the relationship between excess control rights and corporate value of listed companies in China.Thirdly,in order to obtain more reliable conclusions,this paper goes deep into the specific business activities of the enterprise,selects three possible “tunnel mining” methods of non-fair related transactions,capital occupation and credit occupation,and further verifies the control rights and cash flow rights from the behavioral level.The separation of the impact on the value of the enterprise,I hope to be able to solve the problem of the agent and other shareholders of China's controlling shareholders and other stakeholders.The conclusion of this paper is that,firstly,the ultimate controlling power of the ultimate controller is negatively correlated with the enterprise value.The greater the excess control power,the greater the separation of control rights and cash flow rights,the more obvious the “tunneling effect” of the ultimate controller.The lower the value of the company.Second,the ultimate controlling power of the ultimate controller is positively related to non-fair related transactions,capital occupation,and credit occupation.The greater the excess control power,that is,the greater the separation of control rights and cash flow rights,the non-fair related party transactions of the enterprise.The larger the scale,the more serious the situation of capital occupation and credit occupation.The motive of encroachment caused by the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is finally implemented to control the specific behavior of shareholders.Non-fair related transactions,capital occupation,and credit occupation are proved to be three kinds of “controlling shareholders to achieve “tunneling effect” and reduce company value”.Tunnel mining" way.