Considering Farmers Individual Behavior Of The Agricultural Trading Game Model And Farmers Interests Security Strategy

In the asymmetric environment of market information,decentralization of farmers often lacks pricing and bargaining power,often displaying irrational behavior characteristics such as risk preference and herd behavior.The irrational behavior of peasant households leads to the problems such as blind planting,increasing difficulty and even the stability of agricultural products supply chain.In view of this,based on the irrational behavior of farmers,this paper uses evolutionary game,"mean-variance"and other methods to analyze the interest game relationship between farmers and distributors in agricultural commodities trading,and discusses the influence of irrational behavior of farmers on trading results and farmers' earnings,and studies how to improve the weak status of farmers and raise the income level of farmers.The details are as follows:First,this article analyzes the behavior of farmers in agricultural trading activities.According to the theory of bounded rationality,this paper analyzes the"motivation-risk-psychology"of peasant household behavior and summarizes the characteristics of peasant household behavior.It turns out that,in the event of agricultural trading,in order to satisfy the needs of the people,the farmers who are in the position of the disadvantaged tend to exhibit the irrational behavior of risk preference and herd effect.Secondly,this paper considers the risk preference of farmers and constructs a game model of evolution game between farmers and distributors in a completely competitive market,and simulates the influence of farmers' risk preference on the transaction result and the income of farmers.It turns out that,in the full market,even though the risk of the farmer's behavior is circumvented by the fraud of the channel dealers,it is inevitable that the business of the dealers fraud is inevitable,and the welfare of the farmer is not guaranteed;On this basis,the government regulation factors are introduced,and the three-party evolutionary game model of farmers,distributors and governments is constructed.The results show that,under the government regulation environment,the regulation and protection of price acquisition policies can restrict the channel merchant fraud,reduce the benefit losses caused by the risk preference,and play a role in improving the weak status of farmers and protecting the interests of farmers.In addition,this paper considers the behavior of the herd behavior,and constructs the evolutionary game model of farmers and distributors in the completely competitive market,and simulates the effect of the farmer's herd behavior on the outcome of the transaction and the income of the farmers.It turns out that,in a perfectly competitive market,farmer's herd behavior would increase the possibility of a pipeline of fraud,which would damage the farmer's interests;On this basis,the government regulation factor is introduced,and the three-party evolutionary game model of farmers,distributors and governments is constructed,and the results show that effective supervision can restrict the fraud behavior of channel dealers under the government regulation environment,while the protection of price can avoid the loss caused by the farmers' herd effect.In conclusion,government supervision and protection of price purchase policies can effectively avoid the loss of profits caused by irrational behavior of farmers and the fraud behaviors of channel dealers,and protect the income of farmers.