Research On The Effect Of Fund Self-purchasing Behavior

With the development of the capital market in China,securities investment fund has become one of the most important fund sources from institutional investors in the market,and thus the rapidly expanding of fund industry produces profoundly influence on the steadiness and healthiness of the capital market.Fund managers self-purchasing refers to the behavior of fund companies or internal employees such as fund managers who purchase and hold the shares of funds they manage.In recent years,the China Securities Regulatory Commission has launched and continuously improved the relevant laws and regulations of fund managers' self-purchasing,and some fund companies have begun to implement a fund-based incentive mechanism.Based on this background,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the effects of fund managers' self-purchasing behavior.On the one hand,it can make up for the shortcomings of the existing literature,and provide a new theoretical basis for the improvement of the fund manager's governance system and the improvement of fund governance efficiency.On the other hand,it is beneficial to guide fund investors to rationally treat fund managers' self-purchasing behavior,make scientific and rational investment decisions,protect the interests of fund investors or avoid investment losses.Based on the "information asymmetry" and "sheep-flock effect" theories,individual investors tend to obtain information by observing the behavior of the surrounding people,or directly imitate the trading decisions of the public and leaders.As a special institutional investor,the fund manager's behavior is more benchmarking for individual investors.Will the self-purchasing behavior of fund managers trigger investors to follow suit and increase the future net purchase amount of the fund?After self-purchased the fund,will the manager reduce the problem of principal-agent and improve the level of self-employment,thus improving the performance of the fund?Is there a phenomenon within the fund family that the non-self-purchased fund transfers interest to the self-purchased fund?These are the problems that will be studyed futherly in this paper.From the perspective of signal transmission theory,this paper takes the open-end equity fund established in China before 2012 as the research object,and empirically studies the effect of self-purchasing by fund managers through balancing panel data.The idea of the empirical part is:First,study the impact of the manager's self-purchasing on the future fund flow,and further verify the authenticity of the self-purchasing signal on the basis of this,that is,whether the fund performance has improved.Finally,to explore whether the improvement of fund performance is driven by the factor of non-purchasing funds to transfer benefits to self-purchased funds.The results show that:(1)The manager's self-purchasing behavior is significantly positively correlated with the next period's fund:flow,that is,after receiving the signal that the fund manager's self-purchasing behavior implies that the fund's future performance is better,investors tend to follow the behavior of the fund manager and choose the self-purchased fund.Thereby increasing the future net purchase of the fund.(2)The manager's self-purchasing behavior is significantly positively correlated with the next period's fund performance,that is,after the fund manager purchases the fund,the agency problem can be reduced,and the interests of the fund investors and fund manager tend to be consistent.The manager will improve his own efforts and then the fund performance will be significantly improved.(3)Furtherly,according to the proportion of changes in the holding period,we divide the fund self-purchasing behavior into two samples:self-purchase and self-returning.During the period,the ratio of self-purchase is significantly positively correlated with the next fund flow and fund performance.While there is no significant correlation between and the ratio of self-return and the next period fund flow and fund performance.It can be seen that the effect of the fund self-purchasing behavior is different when direction is different.(4)When the fund family was studied as a whole,we find that there was no significant correlation between the firm-level proportion of self-purchasing at the end of the period and the overall performance of the company in the next period,and it was significantly positively correlated with the difference between the performance of the self-purchased funds and the non-self-purchased funds.The performance correlation coefficient was significantly negatively correlated with it.It shows that the increase in the proportion of self-purchasing at the company level does not bring about a significant increase in the overall performance of the company.And with the increase of the company's self-purchasing ratio,the trend of non-self-purchased fiunds and self-purchased funds in the same direction decreases significantly,and the difference between the self-purchased funds and non-self-purchased funds' next-term performance has increased significantly.Therefore,we have reason to suspect that fund manager has the possibility of using non-self-purchased funds to transfer benefits to self-purchased funds,thereby artificially improving the performance of self-purchased funds.Then,we further tested the robustness of the research results by means of index substitution,and found no significant changes in the research conclusions.Finally,based on the empirical research results,we puts forward relevant policy recommendations,expounds the inadequacies of the article,and proposes a prospect for subsequent research.