Research On The Influence And Heterogeneity Of Ownership Structure On Tunneling

In the corporate finance field,the ownership structure is an important research object.After the 1990 s,more and more scholars found that ownership concentration is the normal state of company ownership structure.Conflicts of interest between major shareholders and minor shareholders have thus become a concern.Compared with developed countries,China's market operation mechanism is not yet mature,lacking protection for investors and effective restraint on controlling shareholders.Therefore,it is necessary to further verify and analyze the effectiveness of China's tunneling and the effectiveness of equity structure.This paper attempts to study the impact of ownership structure on tunneling and its heterogeneity,so as to propose corresponding policy recommendations for improving the shareholding structure and corporate governance mechanism of Chinese enterprises.Based on the sample of A-share non-financial listed companies in China from 2011 to 2017,this paper empirically studies the impacts of ownership concentration,equity checks and balances,and separation of two rights on tunneling through OLS and 2SLS regression methods.On the basis of the ordinary least squares method,the lag term of ownership structure variables is taken as the tool variable to externalize the related ownership structure variables,and then use the two-stage least squares method to carry out regression analysis to enhance the persuasiveness of the test results.Based on the five aspects of ownership concentration,equity balance,cash flow rights,company registration location and company size,the heterogeneity of the impact of ownership structure on tunneling is discussed to enrich the research conclusions.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: equity concentration,equity checks and balances are negatively correlated with tunneling;after improving the endogenous problem of the model,the results show that cash flow right is negatively correlated with tunneling while separation of rights is positively correlated with tunneling,and the higher the control right,the less tunneling;only in the companies with higher degree of concentration of ownership,the restraining effect of ownership concentration on tunneling is significant;the lower level of equity checks and balances do not significantly reduce tunneling;in non-first-tier cities,the higher degree of separation of two rights bring more significant harm to corporate governance;when the size of the company is small,the profitability and development ability of the company is not stable enough,and the support motivation of the major shareholders is relatively weak.At this time,equity concentration and equity checks and balances can not play an effective role,but the impact of the separation of two rights on tunneling is more significant.