An Empirical Study On The Impact Of Ownership Structure On The Protection Of Accounting Investors

Investor Protection is an important factor that influences and promotes the long-term sustainable development of capital market.The ownership structure is the core of the corporate governance structure.A reasonable ownership structure can promote the perfection of the corporate governance structure and protect the interests of investors.However,because of the particularity of China's national conditions,the ownership structure is highly concentrated,the listed company is easy to appear the behavior of the controlling shareholder to encroach on the company's interests.Related Related Party transactions,information disclosure and agency problems are gradually emerging,which may harm the interests of investors,so it is crucial to study the impact of Equity Structure of listed companies on investor protection.At present,the existing investor protection mechanisms include market mechanism,legal mechanism and regulatory mechanism.However,China can not give full play to their role,so the alternative mechanism of investor protection has become a necessity,and the pricing function and governance function of accounting make accounting standards become an alternative mechanism.Therefore,this paper measures investor protection from the perspective of accounting and studies the impact of ownership structure on investor protection.Based on the principal-agent theory,the theory of stakeholders and the theory of accounting investor protection,this paper adopts the research method of combining theory with demonstration,the research hypothesis of ownership concentration degree,ownership balance degree,ownership attribute and accounting investor protection are put forward.Select the A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018 as the research sample,select the qualified and complete data listed companies,first of all the sample descriptive statistics and correlation analysis,then we use the fixed-effect model which is tested by Hausman and the mixed regression to study the impact of ownership structure on the protection of accounting investors.Finally,threshold regression is used to study the jump and mutation of equity concentration and equity balance in accounting investor protection.The results show that: the degree of equity concentration of listed companies has an inverse u-shaped relationship to the protection of accounting investors,I.E.Moderate Equity Concentration is conducive to the protection of accounting investors;The checks and balances of other shareholders on large shareholders are beneficial to the protection of investors,and state-controlled enterprises are more beneficial to the protection of accounting investors than non-state-controlled enterprises.In the threshold regression,it is found that the proportion of the largest shareholder holding more than 24.59% has a significant positive correlation to the protection of accounting investors,and the influence of the degree of equity balance on the protection of accounting investors shows a phenomenon of first rising and then declining.In the study with the company size as the threshold variable,it is found that with the increase of the company size,the impact of ownership concentration on the protection of accounting investors shows a sudden change phenomenon of first rising,then falling and then rising,the degree of equity balance has a positive effect on the protection of accounting investors.Finally,the paper makes a summary of the research conclusions,and put forward the limitations of the article and the prospects for future research.