Research On Institutional Investors And Corporate Innovation

As the main body of market economy,enterprises must rely on the development of corporate innovation activities if they want to realize the sustainable growth of corporate interests and the steady promotion of corporate value.The innovation at the company level is restricted by the agency problem.Therefore,the corporate governance mechanism becomes the key factor affecting corporate innovation.With the rapid growth of institutional investors in China's capital market,its participation in corporate governance has gradually changed from "voting by feet" to "voting by hand",and institutional investors have their own professional advantages,capital advantages,and personnel advantages,which make them have the ability and intention to actively participate in corporate governance.How institutional investors have influenced corporate R&D activities has become a research hotspot in academia.However,this paper makes a more in-depth discussion and research on this issue.Based on the heterogeneity of institutional investors,it is believed that different types of institutional investors play different roles in corporate governance.This paper also introduces two managers hypothesis theory that institutional investors play a supervisory role,combines product market competition and China's property nature to find the theoretical path of institutional investors to promote corporate innovation,enriches the academic research on institutional investors and corporate innovation,and provides the necessary policy basis for listed companies.Test by using the data of Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2013-2017 as samples,this paper focuses on the impact of institutional investors and their heterogeneity on corporate innovation and its mechanism.The Empirical results show that institutional investors,especially long-term institutional investors ownership,can significantly promote corporate innovation.Further research has also found that long-term institutional investors ownership plays a more significant role in promoting corporate innovation in high-product market competition and private enterprises,which supports the"managers' career hypothesis".Finally,from the perspective of two-part-time managers,the research shows that the long-term institutional investors in non-two-part-time managers play a stronger role in promoting enterprise innovation,and further verifies the impact path of long-term institutional investors on enterprise innovation.This paper not only reveals the potential difference and mechanism of supervision by heterogeneous institutional investors,but also has important implications for further understanding of the interaction between product market competition,the nature of enterprise property rights and long-term institutional investors.