Corporate Governance?Managers' Behavior And Enterprise Inefficiencies

As an important part of the daily business activities of enterprises,investment is not only an important way to allocate resources,but also an effective way to further enhance the value of enterprises.The high and low efficiency of enterprise investment also has a significant impact on the long-term effective development of enterprises.However,the ubiquitous phenomenon of "inefficient investment" in today's society profoundly reveals the troubles in the development of enterprises,and how to explain and effectively solve the problem of inefficient investment of enterprises has not only attracted wide attention from all walks of life,but also provided an important research proposition for academia.Managers,as the main "managerial operators" in the daily production and operation of enterprises,have the main decision-making power of enterprise investment.Their behavior can be divided into two categories: rational behavior and irrational behavior.The managerial behavior studied in this paper mainly includes managerial agent behavior under the assumption of rational person and managerial excess under the assumption of irrational person.Self-confident behavior.Managers' agent behavior and overconfidence behavior in the process of investment not only affect the correctness of investment decision-making,but also affect the implementation of future development strategy.In addition,different companies have their own governance systems suitable for their own development.Corporate governance can not only play a direct role in governing the inefficient investment phenomenon,but also improve managers' behavior through restraint,thereby effectively alleviating the inefficient investment phenomenon.Based on the above background,this paper takes managerial behavior,inefficient investment and corporate governance as the research objects,and conducts empirical research on the selected data of 3517 listed companies from 2014 to 2017.At the same time,it studies managerial agency behavior and managerial overconfidence behavior.On the basis of the influence of inefficient investment,this paper studies the governance effect of corporate governance on managers' behavior,and further alleviates the inefficient investment caused by managers' behavior.It is concluded that there is a significant positive correlation betweenmanagers' agency behavior and managers' overconfidence behavior and inefficient investment.Rationality plays an effective governance role in managerial agency behavior,but not in managerial overconfidence behavior.In the grouping test,the two modes of corporate governance,supervision and incentive,both play different governance roles in managerial agency behavior and inefficient investment caused by managerial overconfidence behavior.Utility.The main innovation of this paper is to combine the two paradigms of managerial irrationality hypothesis and rational hypothesis to study the comprehensive impact of managerial behavior on inefficient investment in enterprises,and to study the comprehensive impact of corporate governance sub-supervision and incentive on managerial behavior,and to further group the sample observation data.The governance effects of different corporate governance modes on different types of inefficient investment caused by different managers' behaviors are empirically studied.