Research On The Influence Of Corporate Governance On Inefficiency Investment

Investment is an important path for enterprises to achieve rapid development and increasing enterprise value.Investment efficiency is a magic weapon for enterprises to remain invincible in an increasingly competitive environment.Unfortunately,due to the existence of principal-agent conflicts and information asymmetry,corporate inefficient investment behaviors are widespread.Non-efficiency investment refers to the deviation between the actual investment amount of the enterprise and the expected investment level,which is manifested in two forms:over-investment and under-investment.At present,scholars generally agree that managerial agency costs are one of the important reasons for inefficient investment.Specifically,under the motive of self-interest,managers tend to over-invest in order to seek personal gain.At the same time,due to the mentality of job preservation,managers may also refuse to invest in projects with higher risks and generate under-investment behavior.Regardless of over-investment or under-investment,it will waste corporate resources and harm shareholders' interests.As a series of institutional arrangements to protect the interests of shareholders,on the one hand,corporate governance can constrain the self-interested behavior of managers through supervision mechanisms,and on the other hand,it can align the goals of managers and shareholders through incentive mechanisms,to achieve the governance of inefficiency investments.This paper based on the research ideas of analysis of the motivation of inefficiency investment�the governance mechanism of inefficiency investment� action mechanism of governance mechanism on inefficiency investment This paper firstly reviews the theoretical motivations for inefficient investment based on principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,and then reviews the existing research findings on the impact of corporate governance on inefficient investment.On this basis,this paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017 as the research object,and builds multiple regression models to carry out the following empirical tests:(1)Manager agency cost is an important factor affecting non-efficiency investment;(2)Supervisory mechanism and incentive mechanism respectively have the effect on over-investment and under-investment;(3)Whether the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism have the governance effect on two forms of non-efficiency investment through the intermediary of manager agent cost.(4)Under the different property rights,whether the relationship between corporate governance,manager agency cost and non-efficiency investment is different.Through empirical tests,founding the following results:(1)Manager agency costs are not only factors that cause over-investment but also factors that cause under-investment,and the effect of managerial agency costs on over-investment is more serious than under-investment.After considering the influence of the nature of property rights,The impact of managerial agency costs on over-investment is significant both in state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.However,the impact of managerial agency costs on underinvestment is only reflected in non-state-owned enterprises.(2)The supervision mechanism has no significant effect on over-investment,and the effect of incentives mechanism on under-investment is only in the full sample.Both the supervision mechanism and the incentive mechanism have a certain mitigation effect on the under-investment.The mitigation effect of the supervision mechanism on under-investment is only shown in non-state-owned enterprises,and the mitigation effect of incentive mechanism on under-investment is significant in both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.(3)In the over-investment group,the supervision mechanism has no significant effect on the reduction of agency costs in both the full sample and the sub-samples,and the intermediary transmission mechanism does not smooth,which the supervision mechanism restrain over-investment by reducing the agency cost.However,in the whole sample,the incentive mechanism can suppress over-investment,and the mediation transmission effect of agency costs is significant in the relationship between the two things.In the under-investment group,agency costs play an intermediary role in the relationship,that supervision mechanism alleviate under-investment,but the mediating effect of agency costs is weak.And after considering the nature of property rights,only the agency cost transfer mechanism of non-state-owned enterprises is smooth and significant.The incentive mechanism can significantly alleviate under-investment,and the intermediary transmission effect of agency costs is also significant.However,after considering the nature of property rights,the intermediary transmission mechanism is only smooth and significant in state-owned enterprises.