| In the process of China's modernization development,private enterprises have contributed a lot to China's GDP,especially family businesses.Family enterprises account for more than half of the number of private enterprises,which not only helps to alleviate the employment dilemma in China,but also its economic benefits.However,the internal governance structure of family business in China has great defects,and the long-term phenomenon of monopoly has made the conflict of interests of small and medium shareholders very sharp.At the same time,under the influence of Chinese family ethics culture,family teams are often involved in the management of the company,which has an impact on business decision-making.Therefore,in the current situation of weak investor protection in China,the contradiction between shareholders and management and between large and small shareholders due to differences in interest claims may change due to family characteristics and external governance mechanisms.A stable dividend policy not only serves as a means to curb the interests of large shareholders in infringing the interests of small and medium shareholders,but also transmits to the market a relatively complete internal governance mechanism and better financial performance of the company,which helps to strengthen investor confidence and break through the bottleneck of corporate financing..In recent years,in order to protect the healthy operation of the capital market and safeguard the interests of shareholders,especially small and medium-sized shareholders,the China Securities Regulatory Commission has successively issued a variety of policies in order to supplement the legislative and judicial short-term policies of the capital market and the dividends of the enterprises,and achieved results..This shows that the dividend policy is not only related to the interests of small and medium shareholders,but also the focus of the CSRC.Therefore,based on the current situation of China's national conditions,exploring the influencing factors around the stability of dividends has important theoretical and practical significance for the healthy development of the entire securities market and even the Chinese economy.This paper takes family business as the research object,and puts the theory of stewardship,agency theory,transaction cost theory and institutional change theory into the unified system theory framework.The theoretical and empirical analysis methods are used to analyze the effect of the internal control structure of the family on the stability of dividends in the context of external investor protection from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.The study found that the difference in control structure has different effects on dividend stability,and its mechanism of action is different in both founding and non-initiative family enterprises.This paper draws the following conclusions:(1)The greater the degree of Separation between the control of the family controlling shareholder and the cash flow rights,the stronger the degree of dividend unsteadiness.(2)In the founding family business,the greater the control of the family board,the weaker the degree of dividends.In non-initiative family businesses,the greater the control of the family board,the stronger the degree of dividends.(3)In the founding family business,or in the non-initiative family business,the investor protection level can reduce the degree of corporate dividends.(4)In the founding family business,the level of investor protection can positively regulate the relationship between the control of the family board and the degree of unbalanced dividends.In non-initiative family businesses,investor protection levels negatively regulate the relationship between family board control and the unevenness of dividends.The conclusions of this paper provide a basis for family businesses to develop appropriate internal governance mechanisms,and provide empirical evidence for regulators to formulate institutional policies that are consistent with national conditions. |
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