On Middle And Small Investor Protection Of China's Listed Companies

In 1967, Berle and Means's put forward that the separation of proprietorship and control rights was a common phenomenon in our world. And developed property rights theory and financial theory to a kind of corporate ownership structure theory and intrigued the upsurge of the corporate governance study. Agency conflict is essentially the tradeoff between the manager incentive and investor protect in a dispersed corporate structure. With the increase of the numbers of comparing specimen countries and study depth, the real world was found to be different from Berle and Means's description. LLSV(1999)made demonstration research on 27 developed market economy countries'ownership structure and found out the complete separation of proprietorship and control rights was simply a conception and apotheosis even in the largest corporate.Observing with a global view, the agency conflict intrigued by the insider control is not the traditional Anglo-Saxon corporate combat between the managers and dispersed investors and not the only the conflict between the controlling block holders and middle or small investors. So the focus is the property rights. How to understand the different agency conflicts and corresponding governance pattern is naturally this paper's study goal. This paper attempts to compare the different insider control problem and the outsider protect in a logically accordant property rights framework, and uses its conclusion to analyze the Chinese corporate insider control and governance problems in the transition period and give some suggestion for it.