Executive Incentive Risk-taking And Enterprise Innovation Input

Enterprise innovation has always been a hot topic in the theoretical and practical circles.Especially in the context of vigorously advocating innovation-driven,the research on enterprise innovation has never stopped.With the announcement of executive compensation in recent years,the phenomenon of "sky-high salary" of executives in listed companies has attracted widespread attention,and the research on executive compensation has gradually become a hot topic of scholars.In particular,can executive incentives effectively improve the risk aversion behavior of executives,enhance their work enthusiasm,and thus enhance the level of risk-taking? For enterprises,innovative R&D projects can provide reliable core competitiveness for the long-term development of enterprises,but because innovative projects are often accompanied by high risks,many executives will take conservative decisions,which will undoubtedly reduce the innovation ability and competitiveness of enterprises.Therefore,the impact mechanism between executive incentives,corporate risk-taking and corporate innovation needs to be discussed in depth.Based on the above background and problems,this paper studies the relationship among executive incentive,enterprise risk-taking and innovation investment by using the combination of theoretical analysis and Empirical Analysis on the basis of relevant literature.Firstly,on the basis of the relevant literature and related theories,the research hypothesis is put forward according to the research content of this paper.Then,the research sample is selected to measure the incentives of listed companies to senior managers from three dimensions:executive compensation,equity ratio and on-the-job consumption.Then,the samples of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises are studied.Then,descriptive statistical analysis and Person correlation test are carried out.Empirical analysis was carried out by means of experiment,Hausman test,regression analysis,mediation effect test and robust test.Finally,countermeasures and suggestions were put forward according to the conclusions of the study.According to the research in this paper,executive incentive system can effectively improve the risk preference of executives,especially monetary incentive has a significant impact on the level of enterprise risk-taking;equity incentive has a stronger impact on the risk-taking of non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises;on-the-job consumption has a significant positive correlation with the risk-taking of enterprises in state-owned enterprises,but not in non-state-owned enterprises.Not significant.Secondly,monetary compensation,equity incentives and on-the-job consumption have a positive impact on innovation investment.Then in the test of intermediary effect,this paper briefly introduces the test method of intermediary effect adopted in this paper.The test results show that the intermediary effect of enterprise risk-taking exists,but the intermediary effect between on-the-job consumption and innovation investment of non-state-owned enterprises is not significant.Finally,based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions from three aspects: optimizing the ownership structure of enterprises,improving the incentive mechanism of senior managers and strengthening the risk management of senior managers.