Research On The Impact Of Executive Equity Incentive On Earnings Management Based On Risk-Taking

Under the modern enterprise system of separation of two powers,the senior managers play an important role in the enterprise.Based on the advantages of information asymmetry,executives can even completely determine the important decisions of the enterprise,thus affecting the risk-taking of the enterprise.In the process of pursuing benefits,enterprises must take corresponding risks.Risk taking can make enterprises grasp good market opportunities and improve their efficiency,so as to gain competitive advantage in the fierce market environment.Will equity incentive make senior managers make risky decisions for their own interests,thus affecting the risk-taking of enterprises?Therefore,the discussion of executive equity incentive and risk-taking has become a hot topic.The purpose of this study is to reveal the impact of executive equity incentive on earnings management,and further analyze whether risk-taking has intermediary effect on the impact of executive equity incentive on earnings management,hoping to provide new ideas for the study of the impact of executive equity incentive and earnings management,clarify the mechanism between the three,and provide a theoretical basis for improving executive equity incentive mechanism.Firstly,based on the review of the relevant research on executive equity incentive,risk-taking and earnings management at home and abroad,this paper defines the relevant concepts,expounds the relevant theoretical basis,and analyzes the relationship between executive equity incentive and earnings management,executive equity incentive and risk-taking,risk-taking and earnings management from the theoretical level,and then proposes the relationship between the three The relation conjecture of.Secondly,the paper designs the selected variable indexes,and puts forward the hypothesis of the relationship between variables and the intermediary effect.The ratio of the number of shares given to senior managers in the equity incentive plan to the total share capital of the company is taken as the measurement index of the incentive intensity of senior managers.Jones model is used to measure the accrual earnings management,and Z-score is used to measure the risk Variable design and relationship hypothesis to set the corresponding measurementmodel.Thirdly,according to the set measurement model,taking the GEM listed companies that implemented equity incentive in 2013-2018 as the research object,this paper uses the Stata and Spss operation model to test the conjecture of the relationship among executive equity incentive,earnings management and risk-taking,and analyzes the empirical results in detail.Finally,based on the results of empirical research,countermeasures and Suggestions are put forward from the aspects of improving executive equity incentive and restraining earnings management.