Controlling Shareholder Pledge,Power Balance With Shareholder Structure And Earnings Management

Share pledging has become a common financing method in China's capital market,and A-share listed firms are in a state of “no stocks and no pledges”.For the controlling shareholder,the shares pledged provides a faster financing channel for it,making resources to be effectively allocated.For the company,the share represents the ownership of the company's net assets,which is a comprehensive right in exchange for equity investment behavior.Controlling shareholder' shares pledged behavior seems to have no direct relationship with the listed firms,the controlling shareholder's self-interest behavior will inevitably have a serious impact on the value of listed firms.When the controlling shareholder pledge the share,in order to maintain the stock price stability and prevent the stock price from falling and the risk of control transfer,the controlling shareholder is very likely to unite the manager,manipulating the surplus to maintain the stock price or promote the stock price,and the stronger of power balance with shareholder structure can effectively curb the earnings management behavior of listed firms.Therefore,this paper mainly studies the relationship between controlling shareholder' shares pledged,power balance with shareholder structure and earnings management.This paper takes the 2012-2017 data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms as the research sample,and studies the impact of the company's controlling shareholder' shares pledged on earnings management from the perspective of whether the controlling shareholder has shares pledged at the end of the year.Through combing the pertinent literature and constructing the model according to theoretical analysis,empirically test whether the controlling shareholder' shares pledged has the relationship with the earnings management(accrual earnings management and the real earnings management)at the end of the year.At the same time,the control rights balance is invoked as the intermediate variable.Investigate the correlation between controlling shareholder' shares pledged,power balance with shareholder structure and earnings management.The results shows:(1)At the end of the year,the listed firms with shares pledged of the controlling shareholder has a lower degree of accrual earnings management;(2)At the end of the year,the listed firms with controlling shareholder' shares pledged has higher degree of real earnings management;(3)At the end of the year,for the listed firms with the shares pledge of the controlling shareholder,the control rights balance can effectively weaken the behavior of the controlling shareholder's earnings management.(4)At the end of the year,listed firms with shares pledge,listed firms with state-owned backgrounds have lower motivation for real earnings management.This paper breaks through the study of large shareholders as the research object and the cumulative pledge rate of the whole year as the research perspective.It takes the controlling shareholder as the research object and the stock pledge behavior that exists at the end of the year as the research perspective;and joining the power balance with shareholder structure as the intermediate variable,studying the impact of the relationship between controlling shareholders' shares pledged and earnings management,enriching the research on shares pledged and earnings management.