Pledge Of Stock Rights Of Controlling Shareholder And Accrued Earnings Management

Since 2013,the emerging financing method in China's capital market,equity pledge,has been favored by the controlling shareholders of many listed companies in China,especially in 2014,the financing mode of equity pledge has been developed rapidly.The behavior of controlling shareholders' equity pledge can alleviate the financing dilemma of listed companies to a certain extent,and the introduction of external regulators,such as banks and other financial institutions,has greatly promoted the development of enterprises,but the controlling shareholders,as the mortgagor,have a large control over the listed companies,may implement earnings management,and the accrual earnings management operation is simpler,the controlling shareholders will choose it to whitewash the financial statements,stabilize the stock price and avoid the risk of controlling the transfer of the right.In order to restrain the earnings management behavior of controlling shareholders,the construction of internal control in our country is aimed at improving the level of earnings management and ensuring the good development of listed companies,but at present there are still many phenomena of accrual earnings manipulation in listed companies,which have not been effectively suppressed,and the behavior of controlling shareholders after equity pledge is not only unfavorable to the sustainable development of listed companies,but also will reduce the resource allocation effect of capital market.Therefore,it is necessary for us to pay close attention to the influence mechanism of controlling shareholders.In order to explore how to carry out accrual earnings management behavior after controlling shareholder equity pledge,first of all,this paper collates the relevant literature at home and abroad,based on stakeholder theory,information asymmetry theory,two rights deviation theory and principal-agent related theory,introduces intermediary variable internal control,deeply analyzes the influence relation of controlling shareholder equity pledge,internal control and accrual earnings management,and puts forward corresponding research hypothesis,then,this paper selects all A-share listed company as the research sample from 2014-2018,after screening the original research sample data,obtains 1492 A-share listed company as the research object,constructs the corresponding multiple linear regression model,and uses Stata15.0 software to carry on the empirical research,finally,to verify the hypothesis,the implementation of controlling shareholder and earnings pledge management.This paper mainly studies the following three aspects: one is to explore the relationship between controlling shareholder's equity pledge and accrual surplus management,after controlling shareholder's own equity pledge to bank and other financial institutions,in order to avoid losing control advantage over listed company,there may be motive to manipulate accrual profit and reduce the risk of controlling right transfer;the other is to explore the influence of controlling shareholder's equity pledge on internal control;the other is to explore the influence of controlling shareholder's equity pledge on internal control,which is a new financing method of controlling company.The research results of this paper show that:(1)compared with the listed companies whose controlling shareholders do not take the equity pledge,the listed companies with the controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior have higher degree of accrual earnings management,and the higher the proportion of controlling shareholders' equity pledge,the higher the degree of accrual earnings management is with the increase of controlling shareholders' equity pledge;(2)the other conditions are unchanged,compared with the listed companies whose controlling shareholders do not take the equity pledge,the listed companies with the controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior have a large degree of damage to the internal control of the listed companies,and with the increase of the proportion of controlling shareholders' equity pledge,the greater degree of damage to the internal control of the listed companies;(3)the internal control between the controlling shareholders' controlling shareholders and the two shareholders' accrual management of equity pledge,that is the pledge can reduce the internal control According to the conclusion of this paper,it can bring enlightenment to listed companies,investors and supervision and management departments,provide a new perspective for the capital market to standardize the behavior of controlling shareholders' equity pledge,establish and improve the relevant laws and regulations of equity pledge as soon as possible,broaden the financing channels,and hope that equity pledge can better promote the development of listed companies and the whole society.