Analysts' Attention,the Overconfidence Of Management And Innovation Investment Of Enterprise

Since the Chinese Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party propose an innovation strategy,innovation has been the core action of national overall development.Local governments have introduced a number of preferential policies to encourage enterprises to innovate,enterprises are actively integrating their own economic resources to carry out innovative activities under the guidance of various innovation incentive policies.From the micro-enterprise aspect,the realization of scientific and technological innovation can enable enterprises to obtain new technologies,new products,new services and expand their development space;Of course,enterprises need to continuously improve and update their innovation achievements according to the dynamic changes of the market,so as to achieve sustainable development.From the macroscopic national level,innovation contributes to national economic growth,comprehensive national strength,and thus more international voice.Under the economic development trend of "national innovation" in China,this paper takes the level of innovation investment of enterprises as the object of analysis,explores the factors that affect it,and puts forward relevant suggestions based on the empirical results.According to Jense and Meckling's(1976)theory of separation of powers,management exercises the management power entrusted by the owner in the enterprise,is responsible for formulating and implementing all kinds of decisions of the enterprise,managing the business of the enterprise,and regularly reporting to the owner about the business situation of the enterprise;the owner supervises the behavior of the management and implement the corresponding reward and punishment measures for management according to the company's profit status.Most of the previous studies were based on the premise that management was a "rational economic man",while Alicke(1985),Cooper et al.(1988),Landier et al.(2004)and other scholars have found that people generally have the psychological characteristics of overconfidence,and the degree of overconfidence of enterprise managers is higher than that of the general public.Therefore,this paper is no longer based on the premise that management is a "rational person",but studies the influence of its overconfidence characteristics on enterprise innovation decision.Generally speaking,the leadership position of the management in the enterprise makes them easy to be overconfident,they always think that their professional ability is above the majority,and they can enhance the value of the enterprise while achieving their own career development goals.Overconfident management often sets bold and aggressive decisions on investments,financing,and M&A decisions without detailed analysis of the benefits and risks of the project,which makes enterprises face greater risks.In addition,overconfident managers have stronger risk-taking ability,they can decisively formulate innovative decisions for enterprises in the face of high-risk innovation projects with investment value,and promote enterprises to innovate.The continuous development and improvement of the capital market has made the analyst's role in corporate governance more and more concerned by the academic community.From one aspect,as an external supervisor,analysts are able to exert performance pressure on managers by making predictions of business performance,so that overconfident managers can reduce some high-risk,long-term innovation activities,thereby enhancing the business performance of the enterprise.On the other hand,analysts can improve the information asymmetry among stakeholders by delivering the undisclosed information,deepen the understanding of stakeholders about the operation of enterprises,and enable management to obtain more support,and then can take the endogenous financing and external financing such as issuing stocks and bonds to obtain more economic resources to increase the innovation investment of enterprises.In summary,analysts affect the innovation investment of enterprises by influencing management.In order to explore the specific effect of analysts' attention on the relationship between overconfidence of management and enterprise's innovation input,this paper studies this by using theoretical analysis and empirical test method.The main structure of this paper is divided into six parts.The first part elaborates the research background and significance,research ideas and methods,research framework and content,as well as the innovations and deficiencies of this paper.The second part,a panoramic view of the existing research literature at home and abroad,collect the views related to the study object and clarify in the text,and then introduce the research content of this article.The third part elaborates the research object of this paper,defines its concept and describes the mechanism of action among the objects on the basis of quoting relevant theories.The fourth part is theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.Based on the application of relevant theories,analyzes the theoretical relationship between the objects and puts forward the corresponding research hypotheses.The fifth part is the empirical test.According to the research content of this paper,we set agent variables,build research models and use the data of non-financial listed A-share companies from 2012 to 2017 to carry out empirical test.According to the establishment characteristics of Chinese enterprises,we divide the research data into two categories: state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises,and test them separately.The regression results are shown:(1)Overconfident management can promote companies to carry out innovative activities,and the funds invested by companies in innovation activities will increase with the increase of management's overconfidence;(2)The overall effect of analysts' attention to the relationship between overconfidence of management and enterprise's innovation investment is positive,that is,analysts' attention to enterprises can promote the implementation of innovation activities;(3)The positive effect of analysts' attention to the relationship between overconfidence of management and enterprise's innovation investment is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises.The last part,summarize the research conclusions based on the regression results,and raise relevant recommendations for the enterprise and market respectively.From the enterprise level,when selecting managers,listed companies should have a comprehensive understanding of the personal characteristics of managers,especially in terms of behavior performance,and make choices according to the development goals of enterprises.As far as the current development of China's capital market is concerned,we should standardize the development of the analyst industry,formulate a relatively perfect selection system for analysts,so that the information transmission function of analysts can be effectively played,and then improve the information communication between listed companies and investors,reduce the investor's cluster investment behavior,so that economic resources can be used effectively.In addition,enterprises also need to actively publish information,and then improve the internal operation and management environment,reducing agency costs,and promoting the value of enterprises.