Research On The Behavior Of Large Shareholders Short-listed Companies

From the beginning of Smith(1776)to the formation of the concept of equity dispersion until Berle and Means(1932)began to study the principal-agent problem based on scattered equity is a traditional first-class agency problem.However,people gradually found that the company's shareholding structure does not exist in the form expressed entirely by the theory of dispersion.Instead,equity is often concentrated.La Porta(1999)and Claessens(2000)believe that except for a few countries in Europe and the United States,there are mature corporate systems,and equity is not dispersed but concentrated.It is widespread in emerging markets that are still immature.Therefore,the academic community has also shifted from the traditional first-class agency problem research to the second-type agency problem,that is,the interest problem between the majority shareholder and the small and medium-sized shareholders due to the imbalance of equity and control rights.China is a typical emerging market.Since the reform and opening up,the number of private enterprises in China has also increased dramatically since the transition from the planning system to the market system.Although state-owned enterprises have gradually begun to reform their shares,the current common shareholding structure is still concentrated or monopolistic.In this context,major shareholders have infringed on the interests of companies and small and medium-sized investors through related party transactions and other means.In order to curb the short-selling behavior of major shareholders,China has formulated a series of laws and regulations on the disclosure of connected transactions of listed companies,insider information,and protection of small and medium investors,but there are still major shareholders who evade supervision through more subtle means.In addition,the current laws and regulations are not strict with penalties for listed companies,and difficulties for rights protection of small and medium-sized investors.Although the regulatory authorities have already made three orders and five applications,the short-selling events of major shareholders have emerged in an endless stream,which not only harms the interests of small and medium-sized investors but also disrupts the capital market order.This article analyzes the causes and effects of the incident with the case of Zhuang Min,a chairman of Bao Qianliyuan.In 2014,the China Securities Regulatory Commission approved the major asset restructuring of Zhongda Co.,Ltd.In March 2015,Baoqianli successfully completed the listing of Zhongda Co.,Ltd.At that time,Zhuang Min became the largest shareholder of Baoqian with 35.07% of the shares,and held a total of 42.39% of the shares through the concerted action,and immediately became the chairman of the company.After one year,the CSRC officially investigated the fraudulent behavior of the company when it was listed on the backdoor.In August of the following year,the results of the investigation were announced and penalized.After that,the behavior of Zhuang Min's short-selling company began to be exposed,followed by constant investigations and stock price crashes.In the announcement issued by Bao Qianli,the former chairman Zhuang Min passed the asset transfer and short-selling the company.The main means include foreign investment,non-compliance guarantee,and large amount of advance payment and other related transactions.The company therefore accrued a large number of bad debts,huge losses,broken capital chains,production disruptions,and shrinking market capitalization.The encroachment of the interests of major shareholders has a great impact on listed companies.In addition to attacking the value of the company,it will damage the interests of the majority of small and medium investors and disrupt the order of the capital market.Therefore,this article starts with the basic situation of the company,introduces the ownership structure and main short-selling means of Bao Qianli,and then explores the impact of short-selling on the company through financial analysis and event research,including the company itself to small and medium investors and the capital market.Angles.Based on the above-mentioned short-selling methods and impacts,the authors found that the incentives for short-selling events were mainly due to the lack of internal control system and insufficient external supervision.Finally,based on the above inquiry,I put forward relevant suggestions,hoping to provide some help for suppressing such behavior in the future..