Zero-rating,priority Channel And Network Neutrality:Analysis Of Pricing Strategy For Broadband Operators

With the popularization and application of smart phones,the rapid development of 4G networks and the advent of the 5G era,the healthy development of the internet market is becoming more and more important.However,with the development of the internet industry,some internet companies such as Tencent,Net Ease,Facebook and other content providers directly cross the network operators to deal with users,and gradually occupy the user terminals,resulting in the lack of perception of the needs of user for the telecom operators,become a "transportation pipeline" that only provides network access services.On the one hand,in order to ensure the user's online experience,operators have to invest funds to build basic network facilities,but the newly built network capacity will soon be covered by the content provider's new content,causing network congestion and user's online experience to decline;on the other hand,the content provider can only use the operator's network for a small fee,and the new service gradually erodes the traditional voice and SMS services of the operator,resulting in a decrease in operator revenue.As a result,the contradiction between operators and content providers has intensified.In order to change the current status quo,operators no longer abide by the end-to-end best-effort principle,and hope to obtain higher returns through various strategic behaviors,which leads to the discussion and research of pricing strategies.Based on the current research status of two-sided market and network neutrality,based on the two-sided market theory,this paper constructs a mathematical model for three scenarios(ie,priority channel,zero-rating and network neutrality),and compares and analyzes the equilibrium solution of the game.It is concluded that in the case that there is no transfer fee between the operator and the content provider,the operator will benefit more from the privilege of the weaker content providers,and in the fourth chapter,for the situation of whether there is transfer fee,compares operators profits,content provider profits,consumer surplus,and finally discusses the choice of operators' pricing strategies in combination with government regulatory policies.Specifically,through the research in this paper,it is found that the optimal operator strategy of non-neutral network is to choose a content provider with weak market power without considering the transfer fee.In the three modes,the operator who chooses the zero-rating scenario has the largest profit,and the priority channel and the network neutral scenario need to take into account the relative size of the network capacity.For the consumer surplus,there is no absolute size in the three modes,we need to discuss the size of the network capacity.Considering the transfer fee,we need to discuss the marginal advertising revenue m of the content provider.When m is less than its critical value,the operator's strategy is to implement a zero-rating for the content provider with weaker market power,when m is greater than at the critical value,at this time,priority channels were implemented for content suppliers with strong market power,and operators' profits were greater.The conclusions reached a rational analysis of network neutrality policies in countries such as Europe and the United States.The final chapter,combined with the research conclusions of the previous chapters,proposes possible suggestions for the current status of various strategies of operators in China: For the zero-rating projects between the three major operators and content providers,refer to international practices and specific project specifics analysis;for the payment priority channel,because this action causes excessive interference to the content market,it is easy to form a The stronger the stronger,the weaker the weaker situation,should be prohibited;for complete network neutrality,it is easy to cause ISP's profit to seriously decline,affecting its investment in network capacity.The 5G era is coming,and it is recommended to relax the definition of network neutrality,allowing the practice of deviating from network neutrality.In addition,at the end of the article,combined with the shortcomings in the research,the future direction of possible improvement is proposed.