Research On The Mechanism And Countermeasure Of Benefit Charge In Engineering Completion Settlement Audit

The determination of the settlement price of the construction project requires the auditing authority or the entrusted auditing unit to issue relevant audit opinions.Due to the small number of engineering professionals in the auditing organization,the settlement auditing business still needs to be outsourced.After 2014,the competent departments of the provinces,districts and municipalities of the country successively issued the guidelines for the completion of auditing fees for project completion settlements,among which 27 provinces,autonomous regions,and municipalities have a benefit charge in the guidance standards for settlement audit fees.At present,the construction company's completion settlement is unrealistically high(Dai Zhaohua,Chen Hongyu,2017).The auditor can obtain large-value benefit charges through extremely shallow audits.Can the fee-based charging model improve the enthusiasm of the auditing unit problem.At present,there is a certain literature on the research of audit outsourcing management,but there is little research on engineering audit outsourcing,especially the completion and outsourcing audit management.In the only research of engineering audit outsourcing management,there is little rationality in the theory of benefit charging incentives.Analysis;there is little comparative analysis and conclusions under the condition of benefit charges and basic charges in the outsourcing settlement audit business outsourcing;few factors include the "supervisor party" in the research of project completion settlement audit outsourcing management.In this paper,whether the benefit charging can improve the enthusiasm of the auditing unit is the research question.Firstly,at the theoretical level,it is considered that the benefit charging will affect the independence of the auditor,which is not conducive to providing an objective audit report,which is theoretically unreasonable.Secondly,based on the information asymmetry theory,the three-party game model of construction party,auditor and construction party under the condition of benefit charge and basic charge is established.The behavior choices of the construction party and the supervisor are compared under the two conditions.The construction party and the auditor collude,which will reduce the enthusiasm of the auditor and cancel the benefit charge.At the same time,the construction party will increase the probability of inspection,the probability of success,and the penalty coefficient,which can solve the collusion between the auditor and the construction party to some extent.However,the above premise requires higher requirements for the construction party and is more difficult in practice.Finally,the two management modes of "supervising party" participating in the completion settlement audit were designed and analyzed,and the optimization suggestions for the completion settlement audit management were given.The following research findings are found in this paper:First,the benefit charge affects the independence of the auditors and is theoretically unreasonable.Second,the benefit charges cannot improve the enthusiasm of the audit unit.Third,the supervisors are introduced to review the completion settlement materials.It can effectively reduce the collusion risk between the auditor and the construction party.The main innovations of this paper are as follows:Firstly,the rationality and practical effect of the benefit charging theory in the project settlement audit are put forward at the same time;secondly,the comparison of the performance of the auditor's behavior in the case of the benefit charging and the basic charging is carried out for the first time;A new participant "supervisor" was introduced in the research on project completion settlement audit management.