Conspiracy Prevention Game Analysis Of Engineering Design Audit In Government Investment

With the development of economy,the unceasing progress of science and technology,people's expectations for a better life have also given rise to more demand for public goods,thus giving greater and higher space for government investment and construction projects with government investment as the mainstay.Correspondingly,the functional design,structural analysis and technical requirements of the project itself are gradually raised,which adds new difficulties and challenges to the engineering design work.Engineering design is an important part of the construction implementation stage.The early stage of the project has a great impact on the effect of project construction,and it is the basis of the whole project construction.Therefore,in order to achieve effective supervision of engineering design work,it is particularly important to carry out design audit activities on government investment.In the research of government investment engineering design audit,this paper finds out the problem of collusion between the engineering design department and the design review unit.It will affect the quality and efficiency of design audits.Thus constructs the game model,and then analyzes and verifies how to solve this problem under the design audit.First of all,this paper points out that the behavior of the participants under the design audit,using the information asymmetry and collusion theory method,carries on the collusive game analysis between the design department and the design review unit.It is difficult to avoid the collusive phenomenon reasonably without the third party's supervision.Then,by the collusion analysis of the design department and the design review unit,with the help of incomplete information static game,the three-party game relationship among the audit institution,the design department and the design review unit is modeled and demonstrated,and the improvement and control measures are given for the uncoordinated relationship between the parties under the punishment mechanism.The problem of engineering collusion can be avoided effectively by increasing the punishment and reducing the audit cost for the collusive behavior in the design activities.The reward and punishment mechanism is added to the punishment mechanism,that is,the reward and punishment mechanism is parallel,combined with the example verification,the conclusion is found that the reward and punishment mechanism is more conducive to improving the audit efficiency and improving the enthusiasm of all parties.Finally,from the perspective of system,policy and measures,this paper analyzes how to guarantee the effect of design audit,improve the interests of each gamer,realize the coordinated development of all parties,and guarantee the gaming income of the government subject in the real society.This paper introduces collusion theory and game theory into the application research of engineering design audit,establishes a model,analyzes and demonstrates the relationship between parties.It has important theoretical and practical significance for effective project audit supervision.