Research On Product Quality Information Disclosure Strategy Based On Consumer Utility

Product quality information disclosure capability is one of the important competitiveness of enterprises,on the one hand,companies have to pay for the disclosure of product quality information;on the other hand,in the era of information explosion,consumers may not pay attention to the product quality information disclosed by the company,and may generate search behavior before purchase.There will be information asymmetry between the enterprise and the consumer,which reduces the consumer's desire to purchase the product.Consumers may make a search before purchasing a product,and what kind of product quality information disclosure decisions should be made by the company.With the development of omni-channel retailing,online and offline channel information is more transparent,consumers have more and more purchase channel choices and more convenient information exchange,resulting in "Showrooming" and "Webrooming".Under this circumstance,the contradiction between product quality information disclosure of online channels and offline channels will be caused,and enterprises need to make appropriate product quality information disclosure decisions.The main research is divided into the following two parts:(1)Research on the product quality information disclosure strategy of enterprises under traditional channels.Taking into account the impact of consumer attention,search costs,and disclosure costs,the market model of consumers' fully informed,partially informed,and completely ignorant is established,and the thresholds and profits of enterprise product quality information disclosure are explored.Our results show that as consumer search costs increase,companies tend to disclose less information because consumers who do not observe corporate product information are less likely to search for product information.When the search cost is high,the quality disclosure threshold will decrease as the disclosure cost increases.When a relatively large number of consumers decide to pay extra cost for product quality information search,such consumers should only reduce the disclosure when they have some information.Balanced profits depend to a large extent on consumer concerns and corporate disclosure costs.(2)Researched the product quality information disclosure strategy of enterprises under the whole channel.On the basis of the previous chapter,we mainly consider the influence of the "Showrooming" of offline channels and the "Webrooming" of online channels on the decision-making of enterprise product quality information disclosure.For products with strong“Showrooming" coefficient,enterprises should realize that the improvement of online channel efficiency is the reason for the offline channel to provide services.It is not possible to rashly reduce investment in offline channels and reduce the enthusiasm of offline channels to provide services.Compared with the "Webrooming",the"Showrooming" has a greater impact on the decision-making of enterprise product quality information disclosure.Although the online market brings a larger range of consumer markets,offline stores must take into account the financial pressure brought by rent,personnel and so on.However,companies should also consider the way in which offline channel entities display product quality information disclosure,which can give consumers the meaning of entity perception and physical stores to help increase brand awareness.